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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
In

contemporary markets the mass distribution of goods most often occurs

through intermediate

sellers.

Moving from

the manufacturer to the ultimate buyers,

products will pass through the hands of one or more intermediaries variously called

whole

For convenience we will refer

sellers, distributors, dealers or retailers.

various intermediaries by the general term "dealers".
require a chain of sales contracts.

to the

buyer for a

price.'"

A

sale

is

may

The chain of distribution

sell

This distribution process will

by nature "the passing of title from the

the simplest, two-step case, a car manufacturer

dealer that, in turn,

to these

is

may

the chain of

sell a

new

the vehicle to the ultimate buyer.

seller

of goods. To take

title

vehicle to the retail car

The two

separate contracts

of sale are between the manufacturer and the dealer and the dealer and the ultimate buyer.
In

this,

and

more complicated

in

distributional

schemes involving multiple

intermediaries, the manufacturers and the ultimate buyers are not as a matter of form

parties to the

document as

same

contract.

Their names do not appear together on the same contract

parties assenting to the bargain.

agreement. Thus,

it

is

customary

contractually remote that the

not exist between them.

U.C.C. §2-106(1) (1999).

They do not sign

to say that the

the

same written

sales

manufacturer and the ultimate buyer are

somewhat strange thing we

call "privity

of contract" does

Despite the absence of conventional privity, there will frequently be communications,

which pass from the manufacturer

(or related corporate entity acting

manufacturer) to the ultimate buyer. The manufacturer

may

actively

on behalf of the

assume

the role of

warrantor by sending a communication along with the goods or the manufacturer

found

to

may be

have made a warranty independently of the distribution process by advertising

addressed to the public.
has recently

It

become common

as "pass through" warranties.

run with goods

much

estate transactions.

certificate in the

to refer to warranties that

They accompany

box

goods down the chain of

the

good

as a traditional warranty of

The warranty booklet

that

which the computer

in

attached to the herbicide container are

all

title

comes with
is

accompany

the

goods

title.

They

runs with the land in real
the

new

car, the

warranty

delivered, the manufacturer's label

examples of "pass through" warranties.

"Pass through" warranties tend to provide a comprehensive statement of the
manufacturer's legal responsibility for the quality of the goods.

They provide

warranties in the sense of stating both an affirmative warranty
restrictions or limitations

restrictions

on the commitment.

commitment and

Disclaimers, remedy limitations, time

accompany assurances.

The package of commitment and

The warranty package
responsibility.

new

is

and also

restriction

is

presented as part of the contract.

a precisely defined statement of the warrantor's

The manufacturer intends

the ultimate buyer

respect to

limited

this

legal

warranty package to run to the benefit of

to restrict the rights

of that ultimate buyer. Particularly with

vehicles, equipment and other

complex products some type of limited

"pass through" warranty

is

necessary to induce the purchaser of the product. The dealer

is

Without

authorized to deliver the "pass through" on behalf of the remote warrantor.

too

much

strain,

one could even say

that the warranting

manufacturer joins the ultimate

sale transaction for the limited purpose of giving a limited warranty.

In contrast with "pass

through" warranties, warranties made

addressed to the public are separated

The manufacturer may describe
magazines or on

TV

the

in

advertising

in

time and space from the ultimate sale transaction.

goods or announce

newspapers or

their capabilities in

or radio or other media address to the public. In these situations, the

communications are separated from the immediate distributional process.

But

at

times

statements in media advertising are held to be express warranties under the present article
2 of the

UCC.

Advertising warranties are an "end-run" direct from the manufacturer to

the targeted audience of prospective buyers. Advertising warranties have an impact on

the

human psychology.

Advertising companies

in

order to engage the attention of the

consumer create impressive advertisements. Mostly, consumers buy

many of

those

the advertising materials

may

they are impressed by the words used on the advertisement.
create an express warranty.

Sometimes wording on

goods because

the

Actually

mislead the consumer or the words used on the advertising material are
those cases the consumer

is

false.

Most consumers have

little

regarding the accuracy of the information given in those advertisements.
the manufacturers "advertising

is

knowledge

According

not supposed to inform, but to persuade."-

consumers are persuaded, induced

See John A.

in

impressed with the advertising mostly without knowing that

they create an express warranty or are false.

the

Even

to

buy the goods and impressed with the

Howard & James Hulbert. Advertising And The Public Interest.

2

(

1

973).

to

The more

advertising, the

used

more they buy

the

goods of the manufacturers. Therefore, the language

in the advertising materials is

always attractive and impressive.

"Advertising

contributes to economic growth by complementing the efforts to create

improved products through expenditures
and

its

for research

on human beings have been described

effects

and development."'

new and

Advertising

in these terms:

"[AJdvertising, by acquainting the consumer with the values of

new

products,

widens the market for these products, pushes forward their acceptance by the
the investment and entrepreneurship necessary for
innovation. Advertising, in short, holds out the promise of a greater and speedier
return than would occur without such methods, thus stimulating investment,
growth, and diversity.""

consumer and encourages

In contrast to "pass

through" warranties, advertising warranties do not provide a

comprehensive statement of the manufacturer's
advertising states the positive.

will

Whatever

legal responsibilities.

the restrictions are

normally be found apart from the advertising

in contract

distributional process including "pass through" warranties

product.

One of

on warranty

Normally, the
liability,

documents of the

accompanying

the advertised

the critical issues with respect to advertising warranties

relationship to the formal

create liability distinct

documents

in the chain

they

is

their

of title. Does the warranty affirmation

from those documents or the warrantor's

liability restricted

by

the

limitations of the formal contracts?

Both "pass through" and advertising warranties carry the characteristic of
adhesion contracts. In adhesion contracts, the stronger party can dictate the terms of the
contract to the

'

party,

who

See Jules Back.man. Advertising

'See Id.
'

weaker

Cf.

has no chance to negotiate on the terms of the contract.'

And Competition

22 (1967).

at 22.

Anthony

T.

Kronman. Paternalism and the

Lav.-

of Contracts. 92 Yale

L.J. 763. at

770 (1983).

The

three elements

must be

satisfied before

an adhesion contract

may

Those

be found.

are:

agreement must occur

form of a standardized contract prepared or
adopted by one party for the acceptance of the other, and (2) the party proffering
the standardized contract must enjoy a superior bargaming position because the
weaker party virtually cannot avoid doing business under the particular contract
terms, and (3) the contract must be offered to the weaker party on a take-it-or"(1) the

in the

leave-it basis, without the opportunity for bargaining."^

The

law

sales

In the early half

UCC

was

the

model of the English

drafted, the drafters

English model.

formed under the influence of the
the principles of the

Common

of the 20'^ century. Professor Samuel Williston drafted the

Uniform Sales Act based on
the

initially

The English Sales Act derived from

English Sales Act.

Law.

United States was

in the

were

still

One can

legislation.

say that

when

influenced by the Uniform Sales Act and

In this connection, during the drafting process

of the

UCC

its

the drafters

focused on the express warranties, which are directly negotiated between the merchants.
In

some ways

UCC

is

this statutory

puzzling.

treatment of express warranties in the original article 2 of the

Professor Karl Llewelyn believed that the

recurring business situations.

However,

address these recurring patterns of warranty.

the warranty rules of article 2 did not

These patterns may have been avoided

because of the controversy concerning privity of contract.^

The "pass through" and

Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement As An
Rev. 319, at 328 (1999).
section 37 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which was prepared by Karl Llewelyn

See Batya Goodman, Honey.
Adhesion Contract. 21 CaRDOZO
to

should be adapted to

Moreover, Llewelyn was certainly aware of both "pass

through" and advertising patterns.

The comment

UCC

I

L.

reads as follows "This section consolidates and systematizes the material of Original Act, sections 12, 14

and 16 and the better case-law thereunder.
Direct Scope: The section

made by

any approval of the view
in their

limited

is

is

limited in

its

scope and direct purpose to dealing with warranties

the seller to the buyer as a part of a contract for sale; but the section does not thereby constitute
still

sometimes judicially expressed

that warranties or equivalent obligations are

nature confined to contracts for sale or to the direct parties to such a contract.

fact that warranties

anse

in a

bailment of hire whether such bailment

is

itself the

main

Quite apart from the
contract, or

is

merely

advertising warranties were not the drafting focus of the present article

have been forced

to try to

address the needs of the

The proposed revision of

new age and

this

courts

article 2 attempts to

expressly address the "pass through" and

advertising warranties in separate sections of the

be drafted for

The

extend the statutory provisions of the present article 2 to "pass

through" and advertising warranties.

will

2.

new

article.

For the

first

time, article 2

warranty area to follow Llewelyn's drafting philosophy.

In this thesis, after

examining the express warranties under the present

article 2,

"pass through" and advertising warranties will be examined under the present and under
the proposed revision of article 2, respectively.

In this context, the

advantages and the

disadvantages of the revision and the gaps of the present article 2 will be examined.

lines

of case law growth, and section 43 on beneficianes. expressly recognizes the development within a
which the cases have demonstrated to be sound. Beyond that this act leaves the matter to the

particular area

case law, with the suggestion from section

guidance

in dealing

1

(3), that the policies laid

with further cases as they anse.

down

in this act

may

offer useful

CHAPTER II
EXPRESS WARRANTIES UNDER THE PRESENT ARTICLE

A.

In

IMPORTANCE OF WARRANTY LAW IN ECONOMIC LOSS CASES
commercial

life,

products often do not perform as expected. Both business and

consumer buyers encounter disappointed expectations. When
economic, the disappointed buyer must normally look
remedy. Warranty law becomes the
claims

in

Economic

2

negligence and
loss has

critical

"[D]amages

to the

not available

when

Supreme Court

Illinois

is

law of warranty for a

source of the buyer's rights, because

strict liability are

been defined by the

the result of expectations

the loss

is

tort

law

economic*

as:

of repair and replacement of the defective

for inadequate value, costs

product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of any personal injury or

damage

to other property, as well as the diminution in value of the product

because

it

which

it

was manufactured and

sold."^

In other

words, economic loss

is

is

inferior in quality

and does not work

"the

for the general

damage flowing

product quality."'" Under the economic loss doctrine "once loss

cannot be recovered

at least in

misrepresentation.""

It

between "what

^

See

eg

is tort

v.

is

and what

v.

is

not.'"-

When

Transamenca Delaval

an action

Inc.

106

is

S. Ct.

from insufficient

defined as economic

and perhaps not

strict tort

can be said that economic loss doctrine

East River S.S. Corp.,

Distnbutors Inc.

negligence or

directly

purposes for

is

in

it

fraud or

the separation line

brought "to recover damages

2295 (1986); Spnng Motors

Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555. 489 A.2d 660 (1985).

Moorman Manufacturing Co.. v. National Tank Co.. 91 Ill.Zd 69. 435 N.E.2d 443. 61 111. Dec. 746 (1982).
See J.\MES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS. UNIFORM C0MMERC1.^L CODE § 11-5. at 405 5th ed. 2000).
''White & Summers, supra note 10, § 10-5. at 395.
' White & Summers, supra note 10. § 11-5. at 405.

""

'°

(

for inadequate value, costs

economic

loss.'"^

Economic

of repair and replacement of defective goods
loss has

two

this

one

for

is

Direct economic loss "includes ordinar\'

types.

of bargain damages: the difference between the actual value of the goods accepted

loss

and the value they would have had
economic

loss,

if

they had been as warranted.'"''

namely, consequential economic

purchaser suffers beyond direct economic

good

will are t>'pically consequential

any of these losses

is in

warranty, which

is

Losses

loss.'"-

economic

"encompasses

loss,

all

Another type of

economic harm a

like lost profits

The normal remedy

losses.

and

loss

of

to recover for

considered to be a contractual rather than

tort

remedy.

B.

INTRODUCTION TO EXPRESS WARRANTIES

In general terms, warranty

of a statement by a

seller

is

"an assurance or guaranty, either express

of goods, or implied by law, having reference

the character, quality or fitness

of purpose of the goods. "'^

UCC

sale

of goods and the creation of express warranties with respect

this

connection "the law of warranty has borrowed

tort,

contract,

and

property.'"**

Implied warranties

its

may

form

and ensuring

to

article 2

to the sale

in the

governs the

of goods." In

concepts from the legal coffers of
closely resemble tort claims.

But

express warranties are customarily thought of as contractual.

The words and
warranties.

White

'"^

the actions of the seller are critical to the establishment of express

Section 2-313 of the

&

UCC

sets out the

Summers, supra note 10. § 1-4. at 404.
WHITE & SUMMERS. 5wpro
White «& Slmmers. supra note 10. § 11-5. at 405.
""Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (6'*' ed. 1990).
[-

See

§ 2-l\4{2): see also

elements of express warranty. Under

1

note 10. §

1

1-5. at

405.

U.C.C. §2-102(1999).

Douglas J. Whaley. Problems and Materials on Commercial Law 69 (2nd ed. 1990).
Cf. Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Sales Law Domestic and International 254

(1999).

section 2-313, an express warranty can arise either from a seller's promises or statements

relating to the goods'" or descriptions of goods-' or

the

presents to the buyer."

seller

communications must
requirement

is

vague

made

affirmations

satisfy

in

is

to

from models or samples of goods

The key requirement which

all

seller's

the

is

created; but an opinion or

goods does not create a warranty.

affirmations of the seller are

deemed

Section 2-

opinion and an affirmation of fact that becomes a

part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty

commendation of

This

whether the

the question of

after or before the bargain also create express warranties.

313 distinguishes between the

of these

be "part of the basis of the bargain."-'

meaning and does not answer

that

to create

Accordingly, only the

an express warranty. In other words,

seller expresses his opinion regarding the product, this

if the

does not create an express

warranty. Section 2-313(2) declares "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a

statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods

does not create a warranty." In deciding whether a statement of a

seller

is

mere puffing

or an affirmation of fact, the background of the events, the parties to the transaction and

the ultimate

aim of the

Once
that

it

parties

validity has

must be taken

into consideration.

been established, section 2-313 has "universal application

in

applies both in present sales and in contracts to sell and without regard to whether

the seller

is

a manufacturer, grower, or merchant, or whether he regularly or casually sells

goods of the kind

in question."-^

Hence, "an express warranty arises when the

seller

does

-''SeeU.C.C. §2-313(l)(a).

-'5<?eU.C.C. §2-313(1)

(b).

-5t?^U.C.C. §2-313(1 )(c).
- Cf. John L. Amabile, Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts. Chapter 72. Warranties. 5
Bus. & Com. LiTiG. Fed. Cts. S. llA.see also WILLIAM H. Lawrence & William H. Henning,
Understanding Sales AND Leases OF Goods § 5.02. at 120(1996).
-"
See American Law of Warranties. § 2:3. at 98 (Clark, Boardman. Callaghan eds. 1991
).

10

something affirmative

create buyer expectations about the characteristic

to

performance of the goods."-- To

this end, a seller

can make oral or written representation

regarding his product through advertising, brochures or written contract, which
qualify as part of the basis of the bargain, rather than puffmg.-*
points out that "any affirmation of fact or promise

relates to the goods''-^

may

qualify.

The

or

made by

Section 2-313(l)(a)

the seller to the buyer,

drafters of article 2

may

seem

to

which

have visualized

express warranties as emerging from the negotiations of the parties.

Comment

1

of section 2-313 states

"Express warranties

rest

on dickered aspects of the individual bargain, and go so
words of disclaimer in a form are

clearly to the essence of that bargain that

repugnant to the basic dickered terms."'^

As

will

be explained below,

if the

statements of the seller relate to the essential

aspects of the bargain then they are said to create an express warranty.

Furthermore,

these statements are hard to disclaim since they are related to the essential terms of the

bargain and they are explicit.

According

Comment

to

3

of section 2-313

"The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the seller, descriptions of
the goods or exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other part of a negotiation
which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific intention to make warranty is
necessary

is made part of the basis of the bargain.
made by the seller about the goods during

any of these factors

if

practice affirmations of fact

In actual

a bargain

no particular reliance
on such statements need be shown in order to wave them into the fabric of the
agreement. Rather, any fact, which is to take such affirmations once made, out of
the agreement requires clear affirmative proof The issue is normally one of
are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence

fact."^^

-^

-^

See

Whaley supra

note

Cf. W HALEY supra note

"U.C.C. §2-3 13(1

18. at 71
18. at 12:

)(a),( 1999).

-'U.C.C. §2-313, cmt.

1

(1999).

-'U.C.C. §2-313 cmt. 3(1999).

see also U.C.C.

§ 2-3 13(l)(a)

(noting that "any affirmation

").

11

Under section 2-313(2)

To

warranty or guarantee.

communication

two

not necessary that the seller use formal words such as

end "the Code does not

limit express warranties to

products

and sometimes vague and general

will suffice."^'' In applying the

law of express warranties the courts have

crucial duties:

that jury

this

about

declarations

specific

is

it

the

deciding

first, in

if

statements are part of the basis of the bargain or

could so regard them, and second

in

determining whether warranties apply to

third parties.

C.

DISTINCT ELEMENTS OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES

In order for an express warranty to be valid, the

UCC

has provided explicit

elements, which must be met.

SELLER'S REPRESENTATION OF THE GOODS

1.

Section 2-313 "describes the various forms of an express warranty, since an
affirmation of fact or promise relating to the product represents the most

create an express warranty."^'

owners' manuals,
contract.^-

A

in the

seller

to

in the advertising materials, in

brochures, or as a clause in the sales contracts or as a separate

can even make an express warranty with an oral representation.

can create a warranty

seller

Warranties can be found

common way

in the

form of an affirmation of

fact, or

A

promise relating the

goods, a description of the goods, or a sample or model of the goods.

'"

See

1

Julian B.

McDonnell & Elizabeth

J.

Coleman. Commercial and Consumer Warranties

§

5.02[2][b]. at 5-15 (1998).

Debra
"

L. Goetz, et.al.. Special Project: Article

Cornell

11

L.

Rev.

Cf. Special Project,

1

1

59,

1

1

70

{ 1

supra note 3

987).

1 .

at

1

1

70.

Two Warranties

In

Commercial Transactions: An Update,

12

It

may seem

warranties; however, the

of preciseness.""

UCC

that the

UCC

is

explicit regarding the formulation of express

"does not require a warranty to be stated with any degree

The code merely says

that

where a

seller's statements are

an

affirmation and such statements constitute the basis of the bargain and hence, an express

warranty

is

However,

formed.^''

the specificity of the statement can be important since

specificity supports the conclusion that the affirmation

A

seller's statements

is

part

of the basis of the bargain.

about the goods does not always create a warranty. Section

2-313(2) provides that an affirmation merely of the value of the goods, or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not

For instance, "statements of the seller that his product

create a warranty.

is

of good

quality and that the buyer will be pleased with the results are merely opinions and not

express warranties."''

When

examining alleged opinions, a separation must be made,

"if the statements

of opinion become basis of the bargain, opinions can become warranties."'^ American
courts have further qualified the use of opinions as the basis for express warranties.

example where "the
relates,

it

is

more

knowledge of

seller has superior

the matter to

likely that his statements with respect thereto will be

which

a statement

deemed an express

warranty rather than a mere opinion."" In that circumstances, the buyer will have

''
'*

Products Liabilin: 63 Am. Jur. Prod.

Kimberly Castelaz

et.uL.

Cf. Castelaz et.ai.

supra note 33.

22.

at §

683; see also Shotkoski

237 N.W.2d 92 (1975); Elanco Products Co.,

v.

L.. §
v.

For

less

683 (1996).

Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. 195 Neb.

Akin-Tunnel! (Tex. Civ. App. Amanllo) 474 S.W.2d

part on other grounds (Tex. Civ. App. Amanllo) 5
S.W.2d 726 (1975).
^'
See Castelaz et.ai. supra note 33. at § 684; see e.g. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Moushon (4'
Dist) 93 111. App. 2d 280. 235 N.E.2d 263 (1968); Chase Resorts. Inc.. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (Ed Mo)
476 F. Supp. 633, ajfd 620 F.2d 203 (1980).
'*'

972) and affd

refd

n.r.e.

( 1

See Castelaz

et.ai..

supra note

33, § 684.

See Castelaz

et.ai..

supra note

33, § 684.

789. writ

in part,

rev

'd in

1

13

knowledge regarding

the performance, quality or the value of the

For instance

the seller will have.

in

Diepeveen

v.

good

in the

Larry- Vogt, Inc./'' the

market than

New

Jersey

Superior Court indicated that where a seller or manufacturer of a product states that the

product

is

likely that

which

superior for the buyer's needs to the product that the buyer had requested,

such statement will be held to be an express warranty.^''

On

the other hand,

the

buyer

which the

it is

is

the statement

where the

no special knowledge then the

In this situation, if the

value than the seller

assumes

seller

ignorant, or merely states an opinion or

seller has

warranty."""

''in

to assert a fact

of

judgment upon a matter of

seller's statement

buyer knows that the good

is

not an express

is

defective or has a less

representing, then the statements of the seller do not constitute an

is

express warranty.

The

limit

of the

opinion

seller's

is

Although

statement constitutes a warranty.

also important in differentiating whether a

it

is

often difficuh to

draw

the line

and warranty, "the more specific the statement, the more

seller's talk

between

likely

it

is

to

constitute a warranty.'""

Statements as to quality, condition or purpose of product
express warranties.

noted that

when

In Valley

the seller of a

Datsim

new

v.

car states to the buyer that the car

an express warranty.

On

the other hand, in

is

'*

27 N.J. Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (1954).

**'

Diepeveen

v.

Larry Vogt.

Cf. generally Diepeveen

See Castelaz

et.ai.

Inc.,

v.

Larry Vogt.

supra note

DouTiiev.Abe.x Corp., 741 F.2d 1235

'-

Valley Datsun

v.

Inc.. Id.

33, § 684.

"'

also constitute

Martinez^- the Texas Court of Civil Appeals

condition', such statement

"

may

(lO"' Cir. 1984).

Martinez. 578 S.W.2d 485 (1979).

is in

'excellent

Royal Business

14

Machines,

Inc.,

v.

Lorraine Corp."^ the court stated that a

are of 'high quality'

Hence, a good rule

bargain.

is

in

when

the description of goods

by the United States Court of Appeals

American Hydroponics System,

v.

specifications

may

Inc.,*^

constitute an express warranty.

goods

seller's statements

is

is

that

the basis of the

5'^

Circuit in

S—C

the court decided that technical

To

technical specification a description and in this regard,

The

states that the

determining warranties based on sale by description

valid only

In another decision

Industries

who

merely making an opinion and not a warranty.

is

an express warranty

seller

it

this end, the court

deemed

the

constituted an express warranty.

must establish the basis of the bargain and a basis

for the

purposes

of creation of a warranty.

A

description of the goods can also create an express warranty. This

the subsection 1(b) of section 2-313.

that the description

of an

aircraft as

In

one

case^' the

is

set out in

Georgia Court of Appeals found

"Aero Commander, N-2677 B, Number 135, FAA,

Flyable"^ was an express warranty that the aircraft complied with the Federal Aviation
Regulation Part 135, concerning instrument and visual

2.

What

flight.

THE BASIS OF THE BARGAIN

constitutes the basis of the bargain?

That

is

the key question in litigation

under section 2-313. But section 2-313 does not define the term "basis of the bargain."

The

'"^

drafting history

may show why

See Royal Business Machines,

"

Inc.. v.

this

vague phrase was chosen.

Lorraine Corp.. 633 F.2d 34 (1980).

See S~C Industnes
Amencan Hydroponics System. Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (1972).
' Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp., v. Simon, 122 Ga. App. 524, 177 S.E.2d 803 (1970).

^ See

v.

Id. at

526-27. 177 S.E.2d

at

805.
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UCC, Uniform

Sales Act

(USA) was

was drafted by Professor Samuel

Williston.

According

Prior to the adoption of the

states.

the

The

USA

in force in

most

to section 12 of

USA:
"Any

affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods

is

an

the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise

is

to

express warranty

if

induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and
relying thereon.

No

if

the buyer purchases the

goods

affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement

purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.""^

This language seems to require the plaintiff to prove reliance on the affirmation.^**
In this connection, "it

it

might be suggested

was too burdensome

to

representation or promise. "^^

law required change because

require buyers to prove that they relied on seller's

It

was

need not be the sole inducement

no evidence of reliance by

that the pre-code

also stated that " according to Williston, the warranty

to the

the buyer

is

buyer to purchase the goods and as a general rule
necessary other than the seller's statements were

of a kind which naturally would induce the buyer

to

purchase the goods and that he did

purchase the goods.'"'"

As can

easily be seen "Williston considered reliance to be essential to the creation

of an express warranty."" Williston suggested a two-part reliance

test:

"If a seller's affirmation had the 'natural tendency' to induce reliance— that

is,

if

it

would induce a reasonable person in the situation of the purchaser to buy the
goods then no proof of actual reliance was required. If, however, such a

—

''U.S.A.
**'

§

12(1950)

See generally

Clark,

2-2>

Samuel WILLISTON. WILLISTON ON SALES

§§ 15-17 (Mary

Anne Foran

ed.,

5'*'

ed.

Boardman. Callaghan eds 1996)

*"

White

^°

WHITE

& Summers, supra note 0. § 9-5. at 35
& Summers, supra note 10. § 9-5. at 351.
1

""

1

See Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express Warranties: "Real
World" Consumers Dont Read Warranties. 45 S.C.L. REV. 429. 437-38 (1994); see also SAMUEL
Williston. The Law Governing Sales of Goods At common Law and Under The Uniform Sales

Act §206

(rev. ed. 1948).
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'natural tendency' could not be

shown,

plaintiff bore the

burden of proving actual

reliance."'"

Uniform Revised Sales Act (URSA), which was an expansion and

In the

development of the Original Uniform Sales Act, the warranties section moved closer
section

on express warranties

that later

appeared

in

UCC

to

Reliance was also not

article 2.

required for the purposes of the creation of express warranty.

Unlike the

However,

instead,

USA,
it

the

UCC

does not contain an explicit requirement of reliance.

requires that the promise or affirmation

In this context, "the reason

the bargain.

White and Summers have said
change the law, or

that "it

that they intended to

most unusual case, or

is

why

the law has been

part of the basis of

changed

is

unclear.'"'

possible that the drafters did not intend to

remove

that they intended

become

the reliance requirement in

simply

all

but the

to give the plaintiff the benefit

of a

One

step

rebuttable presumption of reliance."'"

The

UCC

has been suggested that the term basis of the bargain means "the

further,

it

reasons

why

the parties are willing to perform

upon which the

comment

defines the agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact.""

1,

parties agree to that exchange."'^

which

individual bargain.""

'

*
'

The

to

at

434; see also Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform

"^

-"

m

fact."

U.C.C.

§ 1-201(3).

See Hodaszy. supra note 52.
(1999).
U.C.C. 2-313 cmt.
1

at

495

(

1991

).

(

1991

).

defines the bargain as "an agreement

exchange promises or to exchange promises or

performance."; .vee also for the definition of the "agreement" U.C.C.
parties

indicated in the

has been thought that Code implies with that the substantial

It

White & Summers, supra note 10, § 9-5, at 350.
White & Summers, supra note 10. § 9-5, at 350.
The Restatement Of Contr.acts (First Restatement) which

of two or more persons

is

on dickered aspects of the

There A Reliance Requirement^. 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 468. 472

Is

the

or the aggregate of terms

legal reasoning

states that "express warranties rest

See Adier. supra note 51.

Commercial Code:

some exchange

sum of all

to

exchange a promise

which defines

for a

as "the bargain of the

17

which may

points of the bargain,

affect the existence of the contract.

of section 2-313 the term "dickered"

comment,

can be said

it

is

not explained.

Therefore,

1

However, from the reading of the

that the "dickered aspects" are the essential

including the quality of the goods.

comment

In the

when

terms of the contract,

the seller

makes

a statement

regarding the dickered aspects of the goods then those statements constitute an express

This view

warranty.

is

also supported by the

words "go so

clearly to the essence of that

bargain," which can be construed as that the statements of the seller are related to the
essential terms of the bargain.

of the

that the statements

In this regard, in the last sentence

and

whether reliance

to

any affirmation
need put

in

is

is

to

Although reliance

On

is

Comment

seller's affirmation

White
See

e.g.

"'

See

e.g.

&

seller.*"'

Summers, supra

It

Co..^788

F.

the reliance of the buyer

on the

at

352.

1986 W.L.2 13427 (D.Utah 1986); Smith

Supp.

1

reliance explicitly.

30, § 5.02[1]. at 5-12.

supra note

Inc..

courts require the reliance of the

UCC does not require

Lutz Farmsv. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638

Gypsum

some

"•'*

has been thought that reliance should not be applied or

note 10, § 9-5.

Rhodes v. Lodi Door
A.2d320(R.I. 1991).
United States

states that

during a bargain need be shown.

hand some courts do not require

McDonnell & Coleman,

'^

of section 2-313 explicitly

be part of the basis of the bargain and "that the plaintiff

required to express warranty cases since the

I

3

not an articulated requirement

the other

affirmations of the

^^

explicitly require that the statement induce

no evidence unless the defendant offers evidence of the buyer's non-reliance

no particular reliance on a

buyer.'^

mentioned

on the statement, however, the opinions are divided as

demanded."^*

presumed

clearly

explicit.

The language of the Code "does not
the purchase or that the buyer rely

is

hard to disclaim, since they are obviously related to

seller are

the essential terms of the contract

it

1

(

lO"" Cir.

73 (D. Kan. 1992).

1991

);

v.

Anheuser-Busch

Inc.,

Unified School Dist. No. 500

599
v.

18

One of

the

most important points of the basis of the bargain issue

buyers or consumers have
these circumstances,

it

in general less

can be said that

knowledge than

become express warranty. However, once
knowledge of

made during

the bargain

again, the real life facts such as the buyer's

must be taken

the false representation

Particularly in

the seller has.

seller's statements

that the

is

into consideration in the decision

process.

Statements of the seller after the time of the contract formation
warranties

if

they

become

a part of the basis of the bargain.

If the

may be

consumer

those statements after the time of the formation of the contract, they can
express warranty only

if

express

relies

on

become an

they constitute a part of the basis of the bargain." Section 2-313

of the Code "raise a presumption that the statements relating to the goods made by the
seller at

any time during the commercial relationship are

the section 2-3

1

3

of the Code

warranties."**^

Comment

3

of

states that

"in actual practice affirmations of fact

made by

the seller about the goods during a

bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods, hence no particular

on such statements need be shown in order to weave them in to the fabric
of the agreement. Rather, any fact, which is to take such affirmations, once made,
'"^
out of the agreement, requires clear affirmative proof
reliance

"The policy explanation

for the

presumption" as

it

was precisely mentioned

"is in

an economy characterized by mass production and distribution of technical products, the
drafters of the

product from

"-

1

'^

that the seller

1

U.C.C.

§

would regularly know more about

the

greater experience with the product, either as manufacturer, merchant or

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30.

Cf.

^-'

its

Code concluded

30, § 5.02[2] [c]

[ii],

at

5-16.

§ 5.02[2] [e], at 5-18.

2-313 cmt.3 (1999); proceeding on the path of the language of the code and the accompanying
that a buyer need not show reliance in order to recover for a breach of an

comment, some courts have held
express warranty see

e.g.

Lutz Farms

Industnes. Inc., v. Stuyvesant Ins.

v.

Asgrow Seed Co. 948 F.2d 638

Co. 55 Ala. App 525. 317 So. 2d 493.

(10'^ Cir.

cert. den.

1991);

Wmston

294 Ala. 775, 317 So.
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consumer."*'

presume

In this regard,

that a warranty

is

it

has been thought that

created

when

the seller

it

would be more convenient

makes statements about

the

goods

to

to

the buyer during the bargain period.

The

specific statements as to capabilities or age of a product are the

main

pillars

be found as part of the basis of the bargain and held to be an express warranty.^

to

However, under the section 2-313

the affirmations of fact as to merely of the value of the

goods are not express warranties.

knowledge

in

this point, the seller

has to have a superior

order to be found as part of the basis of the bargain.

3.

When

On

WHAT IS THE ACTUAL ROLE OF RELIANCE?

the buyer

purchasing a good from the

is

the statements of the seller regarding the goods.

seller,

generally the buyer relies on

can be said that for the purposes of the

It

creation of an express warranty, reliance of the buyer during the bargaining process on

the statements of the seller regarding the

At

basis of the bargain.

this point also the

goods

is

the condition of being a part of the

statements of the seller prior, during and after

the bargaining process carry great importance.

As

a beginning, "section 2-313 of the

that a seller's affirmations, descriptions, or

buyer

for a

2d 500 (1975); Interco.
Project, supra note 31. at
'"'

1

Inc. v.
1

samples be a part of the basis of the bargain
claim."*''

At

this point scholars are

divided

Randustnal Corp. (Mo. App) 533 S.W.Zd 257 (1976), see also Special

1

See Adler. supra note

never mentions reliance, requires only

174-75.

McDonnell & Colem.an. supra note 30.
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note

'^ Cf.
*"

an express warranty

to bring

UCC

51. at 433.

§

5.02 [2]

[e], at

5-19.

30. § 5.03 [1] [a], at 5-22.
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One view

between two views. '^

Summers

states

on

represents that reliance

necessary.

is

White and

that issue that:

an advertisement can be a part of the basis of the bargain. The

"[I]t is clear that

language of Comment 3

is

limited to affirmations of fact

made by

the seller about

One would not regard an advertisement as being
bargain and therefore no statement in an advertisement would

the goods during a bargain.

made during

a

normally qualify for the presumption that
In this context,

it

may be

is

To

only for inter praesentes dealings which occur

the other hand,

some

at the

for the affirmations

must be determined according

the real life experiences. Since

it is

than the seller or sometimes buyer
In these situations, reliance

As
stated

for the statements

by a scholar

that "it

It

has been thought that the

to the characteristic

of each case and

is

less

realize the false or misleading statements of the

must not be sought.

made by

is

On

generally,

not always the case that the buyer's knowledge

may

of the

time of the bargain. '°

is,

is

of fact made during the bargain,

since they are regarded as part of the description of goods.

seller.

3."*''

this end. their application

other scholars support the opposite view.'' Their view

no particular reliance need be shown

reliance requirement

Comment

can be said that White and Summers states that reliance

required for a provision to form part of the contract.

reliance

authorized in

the seller prior to the bargaining process

it

was

unreasonable to presume that the buyer relied on those

affirmations and the buyer has to prove the actual reliance."

If the seller

made

the

statements regarding the goods in the course of the bargaining process, under section 2-

313 of the

"**

UCC,

it

would be highly reasonable

to

presume the buyer's reliance on those

See for the discussion of different views Adler. supra note 5 1 at 439-42.
See Adler. supra note 51, at 439-40; see also White & Summers, supra note
,

^'*

™

White

&

10, § 9-5, at

352-53.

Summers, supra note 10, at 353-54.
See e.g. Charles A. Heckman, Reliance or Common Honesty of Speech: The History and Interpretation of
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 38, CASE W. RES. L. R£V.l, 39 (1987).
Cf.

'

See Hodaszy, supra note 52,

at

470.
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Statements and buyer has no burden of proving the reliance on those statements of the

If the seller

seller.

made

the statements after the bargaining process those statements

could bind the seller since buyer has reliance on the goods.
seller's statements regarding the

On

this

prong, although the

goods have no effect on the buyer's decision on

purchasing the goods and those statements can create an express warranty.

Some

courts have interpreted and decided to eliminate the reliance requirement
Briefly in those decisions the views of the courts were "if there

for express warranties.^'

was an affirmation of

which was

fact

the part of the basis of the bargain, there

was no

independent reliance requirement as to that affirmation of fact. "'^ While some cases were
relying on the

comment

3 of the section 2-313,

On

the reliance requirement.

ground

required.^^ Their

John

was

cases were denying the existence of

some other cases

the other hand,

for the denial

some

the

insist that reliance is still

expanded notion of bargain.^* In Autzen

v.

Taylor Lumber Sales^' the decision was based on the expanded notion of

C.

which means.

bargain,'**

moment in time, and is
commercial relationship
between the parties with regard to the product in question, the bargain between
plaintiff and defendant was still in process at the time of the survey, even though
the sales agreement already had been reached."^^
"a bargain

is

not something that occurs at a particular

forever fixed as to

See

1

1

,

Cf.
''^

at

v.

Inc., v.

( 1

477.
v.

Xerographic Supplies. 719 F.2d 1092. 1101(11'^

Lorraine Corp.. 633 F.2de 34, 44

Hodaszy. supra note 52.

Autzen
See

v.

(7'" Cir.

1980); Stuto

v.

Cir. 1983);

Royal

Coming Glass Works. 1990

Id.,

at

477.

John C. Taylor Lumber Sales. 280 Or. 783 (1977).
at 789.(bargain was described as an ongoing commercial relationship between parties, not

discrete event.)
^"^

a continuing

105615. 5 (D. Mass. 1990)

''^

^'

is

(

Royal Typewnter Co.

e.g.

Business Machines

WL

it

1

See Hodaszy. supra note 52.
See

content and

Winston Indus, v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co.. 55 Ala. App. 525. 530 (1975); Young & Cooper.
983 ).
324 1 974); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical. 99 N.M. 645. 65
1

e.g.

Vestnng. 2 4 Kan. 3
'-

its

Robert Nordstrom. Law of Sales 206

(1970).

In this regard, according to that view, the

buyer can rely on the statements after

the conclusion of the agreement, because the relationship

In Cipollonne

been aware of a

Liggett Group, Inc./°

v.

seller's

advertisement

believed those affirmations

at that

it

is

a continuous one.

was indicated

that "a

buyer must have

time of purchase and actually must have

at the

time to create an express warranty."^'

However,

as a

counter argument "the defendant could rebut such a presumption through clear
affirmative proof that the buyer

untrue."*'

knew

that the affirmation

of fact or promise was

Therefore, no reliance exists and no express warranty

is

created.

For the

purposes of the creation of an express warranty the purchaser's knowledge that a
statement

false precludes the statement

is

purchaser and the seller

know

warranty, because there

is

no

from being held a warranty.

that a statement

is

false

it

•*

When

the

cannot be regarded as an express

reliance.

In order to create an express warranty, "a seller's statement

must be one which

is

reasonably understood by the buyer as an affirmation of fact regarding the product to be
purchased."**^

In

Royal Business Machines

become express warranty,
purchase good."**^ This

is

v.

seller's statement

prove the reliance, since

is

it

*"

CipoUone

**'

Generally see CipoUone

v.

*'

See Hodaszy supra note

52. at

^^

See

supra note

In this regard, the

Comment

3 to section

48

1

Inc.. v.

Lorraine Corp. 633 F.2d 34 (1980).

52, at 486.

See Royal Business Machines

*'*'

See Lorraine Corp. .633 F.2d.

stated that "to

v.

Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34. 44

at 44.

buyer has no burden

(

to

on the

2-313 indicates precisely that

Liggett Group. Inc..

**'

was

should be one factor leading buyer to

Liggett Group. Inc.. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).

Royal Business Machines,

^ See Hodaszy

it

a reasonable presumption that the buyer relied

affirmations of fact of the seller.

e.g.

Corp.,'''

a kind of presumption that the buyer relied on the statements of

the buyer during the course of the bargain.

v.

Lorraine

1980).

23

made during

"seller's affirmations

the bargaining process are regarded as part of the

description of those goods, hence no particular reliance on such statements need be

shown.'"*'

As

stated in the

comment

made during

that the affirmations

regarded as part of the description of the goods and there

is

the bargain are

a presumption that buyer

have relied on those statements and therefore, a burden of prove regarding the reliance

was

eliminated.

According

to

comment

7

of the section 2-313

states that post-bargaining or post-

formation statements by the seller can become express warranties.

comment

courts have ignored the explicit language of the

have relied on

them."***

become express

Some

some

7 and they have held that

become express warranties

"those statements after the deal cannot

Nevertheless,

since the buyer could

other courts have held that post-formation affirmations can

Since

warranties.'*'^

comment

7 of the section 2-313 supports the

expansive interpretation namely the expanded notion of bargain through ratifying the
existence of post-sale warranties. **

In

comment

7

regarding the seller's representation of the products

may

representations

create the express warranties.

it

is

was

stated that the precise time

irrelevant

Comment

and the post-bargaining

7 of the section, besides

indicating those mentioned above, points out that "if the statement

closing of the deal,

it

may

is

made

after the

operate as a modification of the contract under Section 2-209

of the Code."""

•^'U.C.C. 2-313 cmt. 3(1999).
**'*5ee e.g.

Flory

v. Silvercrest, Indus.,

affirmations cannot
Tire
^'^

&

See

Rubber Corp.. 304
e.g.

Downie

633

P. 2d

383, 390 (Anz. 1981)

become express warranties because of

v.

it

Cf

"'

See

Abex Corp.. 741 F.2d

Special Project, supra note 3
1

stated that "post-bargaining

Motor Lines

v.

Dunlop

S.E. 2d 773, 778 (1983).

1235, 1240 (lO"" Cir.1984)

it

bargainmg affirmations can become express warranties under comment
55K555('2dCir. 1974).
*'

was

lack of reliance."; Byrd

1 .

at

1 1

was generally indicated that post7; Bigelow v. Agway. 506 F.2d

80.

McDonnell & Coleman. 5u/7ra note

30. § 5.02[2] [c]

[ii], at

5-16.
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The other aspect of the rehance of the buyer on
knowledge of the buyer
purchase decision.

that the statements

of the

In this case the affirmation

the seller's statements

sellers are false at the

of

fact

time he

fact

of the seller

case, "the buyer has to prove the reliance

is

the prior

made

his

of the seller cannot create an

express warranty, since the buyer does not rely on the statements of the

words, the affirmation of

is

seller.

In other

not a part of the basis of the bargain.

on the affirmation of

fact

made by

In this

the seller to

the general public at any time prior to the period during a bargain for that affirmation to

become an express warranty.
The reason why

"*'-

the affirmations of fact

made

prior

and the during the bargaining

process are treated differently with respect to burden of proving and becoming an express
warranties

is

"a buyer

who was aware

bargain would not buy the product

if

of an affirmation about a product prior to the

he believed that the affirmation was false and the

product would not perform as promised."^'
affirmations of the seller

when he

is

on the

Briefly, a buyer can only rely

This

deciding to purchase the product.

presumption that reliance exists during the bargaining process and there

is

is

the

no need

to

prove the reliance.

As
shown

a consequence, the best reading of section 2-313 that reliance need not be

for the affirmations

of

fact

the purchase naturally will rely

Finally, the

"*

See White

Code

&

made during

the bargain.

Summers, supra

note 10, § 9-5. at 353.

52. at 495.

at the

on the description and the affirmation of the

itself does not require the reliance.

See Hodaszy. supra note

Since a buyer

time of

seller.
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D.

WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS

Subsection 2-3

1

6(

1 )

of the

UCC

states:

"words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation

inoperative to the extent that such construction

The purpose of this subsection
created with affirmative affumations,

Hence, a

seller

who

is

is

unreasonable."**

to protect buyers.

is

it

is

Since an express warranty

is

generally hard to disclaim an express warranty.

explicitly warrants or guarantees that a

good

is

without defects

may

not successfully defend a lawsuit based on a later disclaimer of express warranties.**-

According

to

Comment

1

of the subsection 2-316(1), "subsection

protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer

when

effect to such language

1

seeks to

by denying

inconsistent with language of express warranty."^

Thus,

subsection 2-316(1) seeks to protect the buyer from the unexpected and unbargained
effects

of the disclaimer.

If the affirmation creates

an express warranty then according to

subsection 2-316(1) buyer cannot be affected from the disclaimer in the event of conflict.
In other words, in the event that there

The disclaimer and

the warranty

is

an express warranty the disclaimer

must be consistent with each

is

inoperative.

Courts have the

other.

duty to interpret the consistency between the disclaimer and the warranty.

For the negotiated deals, "where the parties have consciously chosen terms as
express warranties and have specifically limited those warranties,
interpret the terms as a

whole and

'*'U.C.C.§ 2-316(1) (1999).
"
Cf. White & Summers, supra note

*U.C.C. 2-316 (Dcmt.

1

(1999).

to recognize

10. § 12-2. at

425.

it

is

sensible to

what otherwise might be described as an

invalid disclaimer as an enforceable qualification of the express warranty."^'

deal

is

Wlien the

not negotiated as with "pass through" warranties, "product descriptions and other

affirmations that lay persons

under section

2-313.'"^^

may

not regard as express warranties are express warranties

Hence, the affirmations on the label or on the warranty package

However, the affirmations on

create an express warranty.

the labels are harder to

disclaim since the precise affirmation creates the express warranty and there
possibility to disclaim

One of the
evidence

rule.

it.

crucial parts of subsection 2-316(1)

Comment

evidence rule

is

warranties.'"^

At

is

the cross-reference to the parol

2 of the section 2-316 sets out that "reference to the parol

intended to protect the seller against false allegations of the oral
this point the finality

because the protection of the

seller has

of the written agreement gains importance,

two

restrictions.

If the written

agreement

As

the seller previously.'*^

example
that

new

in

parties, then

Carpetland,

carpet

the second step, if the written

USA

would be

v.

even here an oral warranty

agreement

is

not

is

made by

the final form, then the disclaimer on this form cannot negate the oral warranty

agreement of the

little

is

the final

may supplement

For

it.

Payne'"', the seller's salesman orally informed the buyer

installed if anything

went wrong with the purchased carpet

for

one year. However, the written sales agreement contained a disclaimer of all express and
implied warranties unrelated to the description of the goods.

The court held

that

Carpetland' s warranty disclaimer did not bar recovery under the express warranty. The

''^

See White

&

Summers, supra

note 10. § 12-3. at 427; see also Corey

147 Vt. 477. 520 A.2d 600 (1986).

White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-3. at 427.
White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-4, at 428
'**
Cf. White & Summers, supra note 10. § 12-4. 428.

*"*

'^

""

Carpetland. U.S.A.

v.

Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).

v.

Furgat Tractor

&

Equip.. Inc.,
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court noted that Indiana law provided that

when

a disclaimer are inconsistent, the disclaimer

liability.

the language of an express warrant\'

is

moperative to prevent the seller from

Subsection 2-316(1) "does not say that language of negation or limitation

always inoperative, and

it

is

inoperative only

when

it

the oral warranty

and the written disclaimer

warranty prevails and the buyer
disclaimer can be

is

is

connection

if the

language of

protected.

made by persons

is

this

inconsistent with each other then the oral

different

with "pass through" warranties where the affirmation
the negation or disclaimer

is

cannot reasonably be construed to

be inconsistent with the language of affirmation. "'°- In

A

and

made by

the dealer.

from the warrantor and
is

made by

is

common

the manufacturer

and

In this case, "a total disclaimer of

express warranty by a dealer can be upheld under subsection 2-316(1) even though the

manufacturer

is

simultaneously giving an express warranty.'""^

disclaimer of the dealer has been upheld by

After

all

those arguments,

it

some

courts.

In that situation, the

'°^

does not appear that 2-316(1) compels the

invalidation of a general express warranty disclaimer

when

it

is

obvious that the buyer

has agreed to the disclaimer provision merely because there have been earlier statements

from

apart

"'-

the

formal

written

contract

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[1], at 5-78.
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30. § 5.08[3], at 5-82.
McDonnell & coleman, supra note 30, § 5.08[3], at
Cf.

by

the

seller

that'^-^

1

'°^

1

'**

1

Inc.,

Cir.

AMC Jeep.
""

"*

5-82; see also

e.g.

Transurface Carriers,

(7"'
V. Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42 (l" Cir. 1984). Witkowski v. Mack Trucks, Inc.. 712 F.2d 1352
Troutt
v.
Nash
Ct.
App.
W.L.
(Minn.
1996),
1996
208500
1983). Hindling v. Kline-Volvo, Inc..

See

1

See

1

Inc. 157

Ga. App. 399. 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note

30, § 5.08[5], at 5-93.

30, § 5.08[5], at 5-93.

E.

WARRANTY LIMITATIONS
section 2-719

The purpose of the

the form of repair or replacement,

subjecting the seller to an

damages.

unknown

Section 2-719 of the

As

warranties.

when

is

to grant the

the goods

risk.

UCC

do not conform

The unknown

may

is

to

be looked

the provisions of

the essence of a sales contract that at least

According

In

agree to remedies and control damages as they see

provisions of the contract and the other

available."'"*

can be the consequential

governs the warranty limitations of express

Every sales contract has two places for the remedies

is

risk

in

to the bargain without

a general rule "contract terms are negotiated between the parties."'"^

other words, the parties

"it

buyer a remedy which can be

for.

UCC

One of them

article 2.

is

fit.

the

Furthermore,

minimum adequate remedies be

to subsection 2-719(l)(a) a buyer's

remedy may be limited

repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts or return of the price.

to

In the

event the contract between the seller and the buyer declares that buyer has those rights,
then buyer must give the opportunity to the seller to repair the non-conforming part of the

good.

In this context, "there will be

repairs."'**

According

to

Comment

choose and draft the type of

their

concept of freedom of contract.

no breach
1

if

the warrantor

makes

or pays for the

of section 2-719, parties have the freedom

remedies on the contract. This

However, contract terms

is

to

consistent with the

related to the limitation or

exclusion of the consequential damages are subject to judicial scrutiny under the
unconscionability standard."" In this context "a buyer

'"^
1

McDonnell & Coleman,

"'*'U.C.C. § 2-719. cmt.

1

(

supra note 30,

1

McDonnell & Coleman,

"V/: White

&

to

overcome

the

§ 7.02[2], at 7-4.

1999); see also e.g. Polycon Indus.. Inc.. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F.Supp. 1316,

1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
'"^

who wants

Summers,

supra note 30.

§ 7.02[2]. at 7-4.

5Wjpra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
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limitation of the

exclusive.'""

remedy clause may prove

that the clause

was not expressly agreed

to

be

Subsection 2-719(l)(b) requires that the stipulated remedy be regarded as

optional, because there

is

remedy option

also a

"Comment

in the article 2 itself.

2 of the

subsection (l)(b) creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative
rather than exclusive, but the seller can rebut that presumption."""

Company

v.

Reid"^ the court concluded that the clause

state that the

remedy of

repair or replacement

in the contract

was exclusive.

In

Ford Motor

did not expressly

In this regard, the clauses

regarding the remedies must be clear, in order not to leave any unanswered question.

According

to subsection

2-719(2) "even

if

a contract contains a perfectly drafted

clause that explicitly states the exclusive remedy, the buyer can
(2) to avoid the effect

the exclusive

of that

In order to

do

that the

in the contract fails

of

its

clause.""''

remedy provided

still

resort to subsection

buyer has

to establish that

essential purpose

and therefore

he can disregard that contract term and can return to the other possibilities for recourse.
Shortly, subsection 2-719(2) should apply

when

the

remedy

fails

it

essential purpose.

Subsection 2-719(2) generally applies when under the limited repair and replacement

remedy,

seller is reluctant or

In that case, the

remedy

unable to repair the defective good within a reasonable time.

fails

of

its

buyer must allow a reasonable opportunity and time
defective goods.

Before

that,

In all of these circumstances the

essential purpose.

to the seller to repair

a buyer cannot argue that the

purpose.

"'

""

"

White
White

&
&

Summers. 5w/7ra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
Summers, 5Wjpra note 10. § 12-9. at 447.
See Ford Motor Company v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176. 465 S.W.2d 80 1971
White & Summers. 5Wjpra note 10, § 12-10. at 449.
(

"''

).

remedy

fails

and replace the
of

its

essential

30

Generally, a buyer of equipment, vehicle or other kind of good expects from the

seller that her

may have

new

limited

However,

product be repaired or replaced.
In this context,

"even

if

best efforts to

make

the product like

its liability.

merely a promise to use

its

in the contract the seller

a seller interprets the promise to be

reasonable interpretation of the promise to a consumer.""'

accompanied by the clauses

that

that

is

not a

Exclusive remedies are the

repair and replacement or promises of refunds of the purchase price.

contracts, they are

new,

deny

In practice, "in the

liability for

consequential

damages.'""'

Section 2-719(3) reads:

"Consequential damages
exclusion

is

may be

unconscionable.

limited or excluded unless the limitation or

Limitation of consequential damages for injury to

consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
where the loss is commercial is not."

the person in the case of
limitation of damages

Many

courts treat the exclusion of consequential

damages

as separate

and

independent from an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement. In their view, the

exclusion of consequential damages stands so long as
there has been a failure of repair.

Most of

it

is

not unconscionable even where

the rulings,

which have invalidated the

exclusion of consequential damages concern cases where farmers have suffered large

crop cases.

"

"^

See White

""Sfe White
"
'

&
&

See generally

Summers, supra
Summers, .supra
1

note 10. § 12-10

[b], at

453.

note 10, § 12-10

[c], at

454.

McDONNELL &COLEMAN, supra note

30, §§ 7-8.
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NOTICE OF BREACH

F.

In order to be entitled to a remedy, a buyer,

who

accepts the non-conforming

goods, must notify the seller that the goods are non-conforming.
will

Otherwise, the buyer

be barred from any remedy.
Subsection 2-607(3 )(a) provides

"Where
(a)

that:

a tender has been accepted

[T]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have

discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."

The remedy mentioned

in the subsection includes right to

The reasonable time requirement has

the right to damages.

the reasonable time within

revoke acceptance and

great importance.

Although

which the buyer should have discovered the breach and have

notified the seller differs from authority to authority and case to case there are four

policies behind 2-607.

"According
to

to first policy, the notice

make adjustments

requirement

is

required to enable the seller

or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure to the

end of minimizing the buyer's

loss

and reducing the

seller's

own

liability to the

an opportunity to arm themselves for
negotiation and litigation... Third policy is to cut off a claimant who does not

buyer.... Second policy

is

to afford sellers

promptly give notice of a defect.... Final policy behind the notice requirement is
to give defendants that same kind of mind balm they get from the statute of
limitations."'"

According
commercial bad
the

live

'"
"''

first

up

V.

faith

comment 4 of

section 2-607, the notice requirement defeats the

of the buyer. Pursuant to

that

comment

policy, the courts are not at all hesitant to find that

to the notice

White
White

A.G.

to

&
&

commercial buyers

failed to

requirements and thus forfeited their Code remedies.""'^

Summers, .vupra
Summers, supra

Marine Indem.

"in cases resting mostly on

note 10. § 11-10. at 418.
note 10. §

Ins. Co.,

1

1-10. at 418; see also

576 So.2d, 1330

(Fla.

where notices were untimely Hapag Lloyd
); P & F Constr. Corp., v. Fnend Lumber

App. 1991
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One

step further, whether

anyone other than the buyer has

and whether a buyer must give notice

to

any

seller other than the

2-607 (3)(a) that a buyer give timely notice to a
that

prove defective

different views.

that notice

is

is

seller

In this context

On

not required from third party beneficiaries.'"'"

economic

In short,

On

in

whom

UCC

he

section

accepted goods

this issue courts

have

on one hand, "the courts have nearly unanimously agreed

remote manufacturer of alleged defects,
for

of any breach

different in the non-privity context.

at least

the other hand, however,

consumer buyer must timely

"in recent cases courts indicate that a non-privity

Code

one from

goods are the crucial points. The requirement of the

actually purchased the

of breach

to give notice

when

notify a

the buyer seeks recover}' under the

loss.'"''

one can say

that the

term "buyer" means the person

language of section 2-607(3)(a) indicates

who buys

that the

the goods directly from the manufacturer.

Therefore, the remote purchaser should not be held liable for the notification of the defect
to the manufacturer.

G.

PRIVITY ISSUES

Privity

is

that statement

it

"the

name of a

legal relation arising

can be deduced that

if the right

from

right

and obligation.'"" From

and obligation

Corp. 31 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 575 N.E.2d61 (1991); Amcast Indus. Corp..

v.

exist, the party is in

Detrex Corp. 779

F.

Supp.

1519 (N.D. Ind. 1991), affdin part, rev din part, 2F.3d 746 (7'" Cir. 1993).
Since in the pnvity context the timely notice of breach is compulsory for the buyer of the good, which
serves for the legitimate purposes, see Harry G. Pnnce, Cherprotecling The Consumer'^ Section 2-607(3)(a)

Notice of Breach In Non-Privity Contexts. 66 N. C. L. Rev. 107.
Summers, supra note 10. § 1-10. at 421.

at

135 (1987); see also

WHITE &

1

'^'

St^f

White

'" This

&

Summers.

5z/;?ra

was the statement of

"Privity, in the

law of contracts,

note 10. § 11-10,

Justice Stone in
is

at

421.

La Mourea

v.

Rhude. 295 N.W. 304, 307 (Minn. 1940),
right and obligation."

merely the name for a legal relation arising from

33

In the past, formal privity

privity.'^

was given strong consideration

warranties. In other words "traditionally manufacturers

The

in privity.'""''

philosophy

is

buyers

in privity

is

Present article 2 says

article privity

"there

v.

Wright''-

whose

with the manufacturer can recover from

manufacturer for defective products which cause harm.
philosophy of this doctrine

express

duty of care to people not

from Winterbottom

traditional doctrine stems

that only those

owe no

in

However, one can say

that the

declining.

little

In other words, within the

about privity.

was not covered thoroughly. At

was no national consensus on

scope of the

the time of the drafting of section 2-318

the proper scope of warranty protection.""'^

In this

cormection, "Karl Llewellyn initially drafted the section to restrict severely the effect of

both horizontal and vertical privity

rules."'-'

Section 2-318 gives the states three

alternatives for the extension of warranties to persons other than the immediate buyer

A

Alternatives

and B were adopted by most

contracting individuals

C was

adopted

in

few

who were
states,

limited the extension to non-

states,

injured in person by breach of the warranty; Alternative

and extended the warranty

"In

vertically.

all

cases, the

theory of extension was analogous to a third party beneficiary contract under which the
beneficiary's rights were determined by the contract between the seller and the immediate

buyer.'"-'

Alternative

'-^

Cf.

John

E.

A

provides:

Murray, The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism. 35

Wm.

MaRY

&.

L.

R£V. 1447,

1494(1994).
'-'
'--

See Special Project supra note

Winterbottom

v.

3

1 ,

at

1310.

Wnght. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.

1842).

Hawkland. Uniform Commercial code Series
See Hawkland. supra note 126. at 423.
See 2 W.

'J^
'I

'*H

§ 2-3

1

8:0 1

.

at

42 1 -22

(

1

984).

See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2: Highlights of the Proposed Revisions: Contract Formation. Consumer

Protection. Warranties. S.D. 30 AL1-.A.BA 407. at 426.
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"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this

According

common
their

to

section."'-'^

commentators, authorizing a "legislative choice of limits furthers

law erosion of the horizontal privity doctrine while allowing courts

own

rules

on vertical

According

privity.'"^"

to the

Alternative

A

on whether

the seller's warranties, given to his buyer

"is neutral

and

in the distributive chain."'''

the privity issue

their

own

is left

is

comment

develop

2 of section 2-318

not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law

who

resells,

Therefore one can say that 2-318

to legislature

and the

courts.

To

is

extend to other persons
neutral on the issue and

this end, the courts

horizontal and vertical privity doctrines without being

As one commentator

to

bound

states "the drafters intended the initial version

to

may develop
any section.

of section 2-318

to

codify contemporary case law on horizontal privity while remaining neutral regarding
further limitations

Altemative

on the

B

privity doctrines.'"^-

provides:

"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and

'"

U.C.C.

§ 2-3 18

Illinois, Indiana.

Jersey,

New

.Mtemative

A

(1999), Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,

Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan Mississippi. Missoun, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,

New

Mexico. North Carolina, Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon, Pennsylvania. Tennessee. Washington,

west Virginia. Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have generally adopted the Alternative A.
'

See Special Project, supra note 3
U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 2 (1999).

1 ,

''

beneficiaries the benefit of the

at

1314.

Comment

2 reads

same warranty which

"The purpose of

freeing any such beneficianes from any technical rules as to privity.

without any derogation of any

pnmanly upon

this section is to give certain

the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby
It

seeks to accomplish this purpose

the merchant seller's warranty under this Article that the

goods sold are merchantable and fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods sold are used rather
than the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Implicit in the section is that any beneficiary of a
warranty may bnng a direct action for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to
him."
'"'"

See 2 H.AWKLAND. supra note 126, § 2-318:01,

at

424.
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who

is

by breach of warranty.

injured

operation of this section."

A

seller

may

not exclude or limit the

'"

Alternative

C

"A

warranty whether express or implied extends to any person

seller's

provides:

who may
who is

reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
injured by breach of the warranty.

of

this section

A

seller

may

not exclude or limit the operation

with respect to injury to the person of an individual to

whom

the

warranty extends.'"^*

The

neutrality

of the section
U.C.C. have
in

well explained in Spring Motors'^\ which states "the drafters of the

is

left

of the comments and the courts intervening and shaping the scope

it

to the courts to

determine whether vertical privity should be required

a warranty action between a seller and a remote buyer.'"^*

H.

CONTRACTUAL CHARACTERISTICOF EXPRESS WARRANTIES

Express warranties have a contractual characteristic.
beginnings were
shifted to

in tort,

become

emerging from causes sounding

a part of the basic contract law

"Although warranty's

in fraud or deceit,

on the idea

warranty

that the parties could

bargain for the express warranties as a part of the price of the product.'""
connection, "a fundamental principle of contract law

terms

may be

negotiated between the parties. '"^^

is

that

In this

warranty and other contract

In this context, "express warranties

consist of those statements (oral or written) and actions that seller manifests in relation to

the

goods and are enforced

for the

buyer by the law and they depend on the voluntary

U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative B (1999)Alabama. Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and the Virgin Islands have adopted this alternative.
U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative C (1999) Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming
have adopted
'^-

this alternative.

Spnng Motors

"^ See

Id.

v.

Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).

Spring Molars. 98 N.J.

at

587, 489 A.2d,

at

676.

Required In a Breach of Express Warranty Cause of Action For
Personal Injury Damages!'. 43 BAYLOR L. Rev. 551, at 553 (1991).
See D. Brit Nelson.

'^'
1

Is Privity- Still

McDonnell & Coleman,

supra note 30,

§ 7.02[1]. at 7-3.
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conduct of the

seller.'-'*"

deliberate actions

Furthermore, '"express warranties depend upon the parties'

and are sound

in contract in origin; also express warranties are fixed to

the individual transaction because they are personal to the bargain.'"*"

Dravo

the

v.

The

law.

seller

Cippollone

In

liability for

in

German'"' case "express warranties are created by the express

representations of the seller.'""- In other words the seller

warranty.

As mentioned

may make
v.

is

determining the scope of his

a warranty as broad or as narrow within the scope of the

Liggett Group'"^ case the court stated that "a manufacturer's

breach of express warranties derives from, and

the warranty and the requirements

measured by, the terms of

is

imposed by an express warranty claim are not imposed

under State law, but rather imposed by the warrantor.'"^

As

a consequence, express warranties have a contractual characteristic.

consistent with the face-to-face characteristic of the

opportunity to express

its

UCC

article 2.

It

Each party has

is

the

view and concerns and within the scope of the concept of

freedom of contract they negotiate over the terms of the warranty protection. Therefore,
the mutual consent of the parties

is

established.

QUESTION OF REMEDIES

I.

For the measurement of the damages four general principles have been foreseen
the

'""*

Uniform Commercial Code. Those

See DOUGL.^S

"* See

Whaley,

J.

are:

WhaLEY. WaRR.ANTIES and the PR.ACTITI0NER

Id., at

2 1 -2; see also Collins Co. v. Carboline Co..

21
1

25

(

1

98

(1988) which also states that express warranties have a contractual character.
""

Dravo

'"*'

See German. 13 Or. App.,

v.

German. 73 Or. App.

165. (1985).

at 169.

"" Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.. 505 U.S. 504
(1992).
"" See Liggett Group. Inc..505 U.S.. at 506.

1

111.2d

).

498. 532 N.E.2d 834, 838

in
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(a)

"The court should attempt
position as performance

(b)

to place the

would have placed

"The court should require

aggrieved party

in the

same

him."'"-

the parties to mitigate

damages where

possible."'^

"The

(c)

court,

where consistent with public and statutory

policies, should

respect the intentions of the parties.'""^

(d)

"Common

sense, commercial practicality and

Code

policies should guide

the court.""^

Under

Uniform Commercial Code,

the

the buyer has

two choices

to

pursue

against the seller or sometimes the manufacturer. Those are:

(a)

To

(b)

To keep

reject the

the

goods or

to

revoke the acceptance of them (2-608), or

goods and

to sue the seller for

damages

for breach

of

warranties (2-71 1(3)).
In the first choice

of the buyer the contract

recovered mostly through a lawsuit, and

'''^

in the

is

canceled and the purchase price

is

second choice of the buyer, buyer accepts

U.C.C. 1-106 (1) the remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither

aggrieved party

consequential or special nor penal damages

may

be had except as specifically provided

in this

Act or by

Whaley, supra note 139, at 149.
The Act makes it clear that damages must be minimized § 1-106 comment 1; § 1-203 obligation of good
faith in performance and enforcement; § 2-706 (1) seller's remedy of resale when buyer breaches; § 2-712
(2) formula for damages when buyer covers after seller's breach; see also Special Project, supra note 31, at
other rule of law; see also Special Project, supra note 31. at 1220; see
''**'

1220.

U.C.C. § 1-102 (2) 'underlying purposes and policies of

this

Act are

to

of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
supra note
^^^

permit the continued expansion

parties"; see also Special Project,

31, at 1220.

'This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote

Underlying purposes and policies of
commercial transactions" § 1-102 "It

this

Act are

its

underlying purposes and policies.

(a) to simplify, clarify

and modernize the law governing

make it possible for the law embodied m this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. This Act should be
construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read
in the light

of the Act as

a

is

intended to

whole and should be construed narrowly or broadly,

conformity with the purposes and policies involved."
31, at 1220.

§

1-102 cmt.

1;

as the case

may

be, in

see also Special Project, supra note
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the

goods however, sues the

In his both choices the

seller.

buyer

entitled to incidental

is

and the consequential damages through section 2-715 of the UCC.

At

this point

crucial to give information regarding the

it is

comprises both direct economic loss and consequential economic
"Direct economic loss

may

the value of

may

given and received

is

what

inability to

received and

make use of the

at

its

may be

value as represented.

Direct economic loss

retains the goods,

of profits resulting from

damages

is

may be

entitled to receive

goods are returned

when

there

is

''"

much

"entitled to so

it

damages based on a cover
can be said that the measure

goods than retaining

revocation or rejection.

See Note. Economic Loss

in

it

is

'•

to the seller after the rejection or the revocation,

damages can be demanded through sections 2-71

'-''

is

Section 2-714 applies in the case of acceptance of the goods. Therefore

If the

''-

measured

After the rejection or

different for the revocation or the rejection of the

inappropriate to apply section 2-714

'"

are to be

Furthermore under sections 2-712 and 2-713, "the

paid.'"''

transaction or market price from the seller.'"" Therefore,

of the damages

Consequential

acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and their

revoking or rejecting buyer

"° 3

the difference in

the difference between

revocation of acceptance the buyer can cancel the contract and he

'*"

~

out of pocket

or loss of bargain

value as warranted unless special circumstances exist."""

of the price as has been

to that:

defective product.'"^'*

"where the buyer

terms of the difference

which

~

~

loss includes all indirect loss, such as loss

In general terms,

the goods.

According

loss.

also be measured by costs of replacement and repair.

economic

in

is

loss,

be said to encompass damage on insufficient product

value; thus, the direct economic loss

value of what

economic

1,

2-712, and 2-713.

""'

If the

buyer

Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV.. 917. 918 (1966).

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 25-02[2] at 25-6.
3 McDonnell & Coleman supra note 30. § 25-03[l] at 25-6.
3 McDonnell & Coleman supra note 30, § 25-03[ 1] at 25-7.
Cf. 3 McDonnell & Coleman 5Ujpra note 30. § 25-03[l] at 25-7.
Cf. 3 McDonnell & COLEum supra note 30, § 25-03[l] at 25-7.
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keeps the goods, the damages can be demanded through section 2-714.'" However, "at
the

same time

the buyer has the abiHty for the purchase price of the accepted

section 2-709.'""'

As was mentioned,

good under

the buyer will be entitled to incidental

consequential damages under the section 2-715 of the

UCC

and

regardless of whether he

chooses either of the choices.

According

to another explanation "buyer's

damages can be gathered under two

However, they are

different

from the

common

law concepts of direct and special damages, which the Code

rejects.''**

Primary

damages

are the

categories as primary and resultant damages."''^

damages which "a buyer

are not as promised.'"-"

The

suffers including property

suffers to the extent that the

damages

resultant

damages, personal

applies.

in

According

that the

buyer

and section 2-

a proper case as determined under

The measurement of the primary damages

In the event the

(2).

damages

injuries, lost profits, etc.

714(3) allows recovery for resultant damages
section 2-715.""*

are "any other

goods he receives

is

provided

in section

buyer accepts and retains the non-conforming goods

2-714

this section

to the section 2-714(2):

"[T]he measure of damages for breach of warranty

is

the difference at the time

and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances

show proximate damages of a

'-"'

3
''
'"''**

''"
"^'

"'

3 McDonnell & Coleman 5M/7ra note
McDonnell & Coleman 5w/?ra note 30.

Cf

'-'''

See Special Project, supra note 31.

Cf

Special Project, supra note 31.

at
at

different amount.""''

30, § 25-03[I] at 25-7.
§ 25-03[l], at 25-8.

1220.
1220.

See Special Project, supra note

3

1 .

at

1

220.

See Special Project, supra note

3

1

at

1

220-2

U.C.C. §2-714 (2) (1999).

.

1
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From
indicia

this definition "courts often

of value

use either the cost of repair or independent

determine the difference between the value of the goods as warranted

to

and as delivered."'"
Cost of repair

is

a type of way to

goods as warranted and as received.
primary damages
warranties

at a

which

in cases in

reasonable

measure the difference between the value of the

"Courts use the cost of repair as the measure of

the

goods can be brought

In the section 2-714(2)

cost,"'^'

into

it

is

conformity with their

provided that recovery

should be the amount of the difference between the value of the defective goods as
accepted and the value of the goods as warranted. Thus, "if the cost of repair exceeds the

value of the goods as warranted repair costs could not represent the proper recovery

amount.""^

Some

courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover repair

cost of repair exceeds the purchase

price.'*"-

On

damages even though

some

the other hand,

theory that limits the buyer's recovery to purchase

price.'*"*

It

is

better

courts apply the

has been thought that in the

cost of repairs type of recovery allowing the plaintiff to recover the

the cost of the repair exceeds the purchase price

the

and

it

damages even though

protects the buyer

who

Since "the contract price and value as warranted are not

bought the defective goods.

always equivalent and a difference between the contract price and the value as warranted

'*""

'*'

See Special Project, supra note 31.
See Special Project, supra note 3

at 1221.

,

at

1

See Special Project, supra note

1.

at

1222.

1

***

&

3

22

1

K& K

Sand & Gravel. Inc.. 755 F.2d 87 (7'^ Cir. 1985).
"The court found this result logical because capping damages at the purchase pnce would clearly depnve
the purchaser of the benefit of its bargain in cases in which the value of the goods as warranted exceeds that
'"•

See

e.g.

Continental Sand

Gravel,

Inc., v.

pnce."; ."iee also Special Project, supra note 31, at 1222.
"" See e.g. Richardson v. Car Lot Co.. 462 N.E.2d 459.462

(

1983).
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is

often attributable to section 2-714(2)'s requirement that courts measure the value as

warranted on the date of acceptance of the goods rather than on the contract

Another view regarding the repair was mentioned

in

Cundy

Trencher Service"^ case. In the said case the main thesis was "repairs
into

conformity with the contract also might improve or extend the

beyond what was
in

Neuman

v.

improvement

When

&

Spector Wrecking
in

However, contrary

originally warranted.'"*''^

value to the buyer.'"

Salvage

Co.'^" case

v.

date.""'^

International

to bring the

life

of the goods

to that case a

Texas court

decided to "allocate the cost of

^'

goods cannot be repaired or the cost of repair

the defective

goods

is

inappropriate measure of the buyer's primary damages, independent indicia of value

the appropriate

way

to

determine the damages.'^"

an
is

In the independent indicia of value

"buyer must independently prove the value of the goods accepted and the value they

would have had
them

is

if

they had been as warranted. '"^^ There are two types of value.

'value as warranted' and the other

From
According

'value as accepted'.

the language of the section 2-714 (2) value as warranted cannot be defined.

to the section

value must be the value

"fair

is

2-714 the courts must determine the value. "The difference
time of the acceptance."

at the

However, due

to the difficulty in the

" See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1222.
Cundy v. International Trencher Service. 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.

"*
"^

See Special Project, supra note 31,

'™

Neuman

'^'

For the argument see Special Project.

'

'^''

As

in

for the value as accepted,

market value as accepted provides the best measure of the value of defective goods

as accepted. '"^^

'

One of

v.

Spector Wrecking

&

at

measurement of the

1984).

1223.

Salvage Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.!973).
.9M/7ro

"

Cf. Special Project,

See Special Project, supra note 31,

at

1223.

"*

See Special Project, supra note 3

1 ,

at

1

See Special Project, supra note 31,

at

1225.

supra note 31,

at

1223.

224.

note 3

1

,

at

1223.

fair

value of
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defective goods at the time of the acceptance

resale price as the approximation.

some

courts in their decisions'^'' use the

'^'

In addition to the recovery

of the proximate damages through the primary

damages, a buyer can receive resultant damages, which

is

set forth in section

2-715 via

Resultant damages are the incidental and the

the reference of section 2-714(3).

consequential damages. According to the section 2-715:

(1)

Incidental

damages

resulting

from the

seller's

breach include expenses reasonably

incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully

any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or

rejected,

commissions

in

connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense

incident to the delay or other breach.

(2)

Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include

(a)

any

loss resulting

from general or particular requirements and needs of which the

time of contracting had reason to

seller at the

know and which could

not

reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b)

injury to person or property proximately resulting

The

incidental

rejects the goods.

damages

are appropriate

"A buyer who

when

from any breach of warranty.

the buyer revokes the acceptance or

non-conforming goods may

justifiably rejects the

recover, as incidental damages, the costs of inspecting the goods in addition to storage

and transportation expenses.'"

In order to be entitled to a recovery of incidental

**

damages, the damages must be incident

'

See

e.g.

Lackawanna Leather Co.

Cf. Special Project, supra note 3

1

v.
,

See Special Project, supra note 31.

Martin

at
at

1

225.
1232.

&

to breach

and they must be reasonable.

Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d

1

197, 1203

(8'*'

Cir.1984).

43

According

who

2-715 (2) consequential damages are available to a buyer

to section

experienced a breach of warranty.

"A buyer who

receives non-conforming goods

often sustains losses peculiar to his situation that are not solely attributable to the non-

UCC

conformity, and therefore the

recognizes the consequential damages

when

appropriate.'"^"

The suffered

loss, the seller's

situation that the seller could

proven by the buyer

'*
'

in

breach which causes the suffered

3

1 ,

and the

have foreseen the consequence of such breach should be

order to recover the consequential damages.

See Special Project, supra note

loss,

at

1

236.

CHAPTER III
"PASS

A.

THROUGH" WARRANTIES

REGULATION UNDER CURRENT ARTICLE

The present

article 2

does not expressly address

''pass

2

As

through" warranties.

noted in the introduction part the focus of the drafters of the express warranty provisions

seems
view

have been on direct negotiated contracts.

to

Some

scholars have expressed the

does not apply to "pass through" warranties, due

that article 2

legal relationship

between the manufacturers and

remote buyers has not been brought under the

to the reason that "the

the remote manufacturers

article 2.'"*°

and the

Furthermore, they state that

"current Article 2 does not literally apply to the ubiquitous manufacturers' warranty even

in

cases involving only economic

However,

if

loss."'*'

one examines the cases, he will find

that the courts

uniformly

treat

"pass through" warranties as express warranties allowing buyer's to bring their claim for

breach of the standby commitment under section 2-313."*position

may be on

Whatever

the issue of privity of contract in general, no decision refuses

enforcement to "pass through" warranties on grounds of lack of

"*"

See

the jurisdiction's

Curtis R. Reitz. Manufacturers' Warranties of

privity.

Consumer Goods. 75 WASH. U.

The decisions

L. Q. 357,

360

(1997)
"*'

See

e.g.

Donald

Relationships. 75
'"*

See

e.g.

F. Clifford,

Wash. U.

L. Q.

Mainline Tractor w

Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase. Two

413 (1997).

Nu trite

Corp.. 937 F.Supp. 1095 (1996), in which the court held that

representations on label and label packets had been express warranties and "the statement on the label
clearly falls within the
relating to the quality

puniew of section

2-3 13(a) as an affirmation of fact

of the goods." 937 F.Supp.

at

1

106.
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made by

the seller to the buyer

45

employ one of two

analytical approaches to allow the ultimate buyer to issue the

contractually remote warranty.

Some

courts conclude that by intentionally directing the "pass through" warranty

warranty joins the ultimate sales contract for purposes of

to the ultimate buyer, the

providing the warranty for the transaction. Under their analysis, a type of privity

to exist

is

said

between the warrantor sending the "pass through" and ultimate buyer. Opinions

from Georgia and Vermont
In Chrysler

v.

illustrate this analysis.

Wilson Plumbing

automobile manufacturer, through

Co.,^^^ the

its

Georgia Court has held

that

"where an

dealer issues to a purchaser of one of

its

automobiles from such dealer admittedly as a part of the sale a warranty by the
manufacturer running to the purchaser, privity

exists."'*^

\n

Jones

v.

Cranman

's

Sporting

Goods^^\ the Georgia Court found this principle applicable to the situation where "the

weapon was
Motor

Co..

V.

fully guaranteed

Lee^^^ the

by the distributor

Georgia court has held

a vehicle into the stream of

to the ultimate consumer.""*"

that "a

commerce, knowing

that

manufacturer

it

is

who

In

Ford

sells or releases

likely to be resold or

used by

others than the buyer, will be held liable for an injury caused by a defect

which might be

discovered by reasonable inspection by the manufacturer.""**

In

'*-'

Gochey

v. Wilson Plumbing. Co.. 132 Ga. App. 435. 208 S.E.2d 32
(1974).
See Wilson Plumbing. Co., 132 Ga. App. at 437, 208 S.E.2d at 323. see also Studebaker Corp.,
82 Ga. App. 779, 784, 62 S.E.2d 198.
'**

Chrysler Corp..

v.

1

v. Nail,

See Jones v. Cranman's Sporting Goods, 142 Ga. App. 838, 237 S.E.2d 402
977).
See Cranman S Sporting Goods. 142 Ga. App. 838, 843, 237 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1977).
See Ford Motor Co., v. Lee. 37 Ga. App. 486. 224 S.E.2d 68 ( 1 976).
( 1

"**"

"*'

1

'

See Lee. 137 Ga. App.

at

1

487. 224 S.E.2d 170; see also.

Washbum

Storage Co.,

v.

General Motors

Corp., 90 Ga. App. 380(3), 83 S.E.2d 26; Gnffith v. Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors Corp.,

105 Ga. App. 588(1), 125 S.E.2d 525; J.C. Lewis Motor Co..

S.E.2d78I.

v.

Simmons, 128 Ga. App.

113. 114. 195
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Vermont Supreme Court held

Bombardier^^'^, the

warrants

goods,

its

it.

in effect, creates a direct contract

through" warranties

is

to

conclude simply that privity

allow a warrantor to defend on

Whitman

relied

"when

a manufacturer expressly

with the ultimate buyer."''*

analytical approach to allowing ultimate buyers to sue on "pass

The second

In

that

ground would be

this

is

to allow the warrantor to mislead.

Consolidated Aluminum Corp.,'^' the court held

v.

To

not required in this context.

that,

where the

plaintiff

on a label when purchasing the good, "privity of contract was not required

to

recover for injuries caused by breach of an express warranty and the label was obviously
directed toward the prospective purchasers and users of the ladder and defendant should

have known

that they

might rely

In this connection, a

on."'"-

which are printed on the

the statements of the manufacturer,

written in the warranty booklet, or owner's manual.

the purchase of the product.

time

when

remote purchaser
label

relies

of the product or are

Reliance takes place

at the

time of

The remote purchaser becomes aware of the warranty

she buys the good and opens the box of the good.

on

In the case

at the

of the "pass

through" warranties printed on the label remote purchasers become aware of the warranty
at the

time of the purchase. In any case, there

the manufacturer.

Therefore, they

all

is

a clear reliance on the representations of

create express warranty.

The statements of

the

manufacturer become part of the basis of the bargain. Since the statements are related to
the quality of the goods, the statements induce the buyers.

During the drafting process of the
through" warranties and their effect

'"""SffGochey

v.

^'^

Bombardier.

""

See Whitman

Bombardier.

Inc..
v.

Inc..

UCC

in the

Karl Llewellyn was aware of the "pass

market.

In the

Uniform Revised Sales Act

153 Vt. 607, 572 A.2d 921 (1990).

153 Vt. 613.

Consolidated

Aluminum

Corp.. 637

See Consolidated Aluminum Corp.. 637 S.W.2d

at

S.W.2d 405 (Mo.

407.

Ct.

App. 1982).
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(URSA), which was
by him

in the

drafted during the

comments.

In the

first

comment

half of the 1940s, this situation

to section

37 of the

URSA,

was indicated

the importance

and

the effect of the "pass through" warranties were presented with the sample cases.

comment mentioned

Furthermore, the same

'''^

any

that the section did not constitute

approval of the view judicially expressed that warranties are in their nature confined to
the direct parties to such a contract.

Therefore, before the drafting of the

UCC

importance of the "pass through" warranties was brought into consideration

comment

to section

37 of

URSA.

the

in the

Despite that fact "pass through" warranties were not

expressly covered in the present article

2, in this

connection, leaves us with contract

limitation.

The

issue of the effectiveness of a remote seller's disclaimer of or limitation

made under

express warranties

purchaser

was
to

raised

who

sections 2-316 and 2-719 of the

New Jersey Supreme

by the

extent that they

remedy

See

remote

sellers."'^'

and

in the

On

makes

v.

made

m sales

it

was

Inc., v.

According

same
and

CCA.

UCC,

it

has a statutory right to

3d. 1932, 61 F.(2d) 391

where

it

was

purchaser from an independent intermediary where

stated that "a manufacturer has

literature supplied to intermediary

See Spnng Motors Distributors,

'''"

a remote seller avails itself of the

a special guaranty to induce the purchase."; see also Ba.xter

1932, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 where
representations

to a

Ford

in the non-privity context to the

"when

Climax Mfg. Co..

been held obligated

v.

the parties in privity for the equity

this reasoning,

Timberland Lumber Co., Ltd.

the manufacturer

Spring Motors

risk allocation principles of the

stated that "a manufacturer has

'**

Court

would be enforced between

limitations

e.g..

against an ultimate

did not have the opportunity to negotiate over the terms of the agreement

one view "those provisions should be enforced

fairness to

UCC

on

v.

Ford Motor Co.,

been obligated on

and relied on by the purchaser."

Ford Motor Co.. 98 N.J. 555. 489 A.2d 660 (1985).

See Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the

UCC: Warranty Disclaimers,

Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement
Context. 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 873, at 891 (1986).

in the

Non-privity

the
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expect that those terms will be enforced by the courts."'* Another view argues that "the

manufacturers' disclaimers and limitations prima facie unenforceable
against remote commercial purchasers.'"'^"

One

when

applied

scholar states on this issue that "standard

form documents, indeed, should be seen as things, not as contracts; the choice

is

between

having the manufacturer pass a given risk onto the consumer, and having the
manufacturer absorb the risk and raise the price as compensation.""* Courts have been
divided between enforcing and avoiding manufacturers' exclusions

in

non-privity cases.

Courts, which extend manufacturers' warranties to non-privity commercial purchasers

under the

UCC,

limitations.

face the issue of whether to extend the manufacturers' disclaimers and

exclusions are given affect, this will nullify the advantages granted

If these

to

remote purchasers through abolishing vertical privity requirements, on the other hand,

to

deny

effect

might prevent a manufacmrer from limiting

its liability.''^

The courts gave

Some

theories in favor of the avoidance of the exclusions of warranties as follows.

courts

based their decisions-"" on the lack of conspicuousness theory. The terms of the contract

must be conspicuous

to the

buyer otherwise there

is

a lack of conspicuousness.

Some

courts are willing under the present article 2 to deny effectiveness to contract limitation

based on lack of conspicuousness or lack of negotiation. Other courts give effect to the
restriction in the "pass

article 2

also be

and

through" warranties on the ground that they are permitted by

that a claimant

bound by

its

who

relies

on the affirmations of the "pass through" must

limitation.

'* See

Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.. 548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976).
See Dean Russell, Enforcing Manufacturers Warranty Exclusions Against Non-privity- Commercial
'

Purchasers: The
'''**

Need For Uniform

Guidelines. 20

Ga.

See Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay

L.

in

Rev. 461,

at

462 (1986).

Reconstruction. 96

HaRV.

L.

Rev.

(1983).

Cf

Russell, supra note 197. at 496.

'^'See e.g Groppel Co.,

v.

United States

Gypsum

Co.. 616

S.W.2d 49 (Mo.

Ct.

App. 1981

).

1

1

73, 1209
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On

the other hand, in the "pass through" warranties the provisions of the contract

are drafted without negotiation as

known thoroughly by

was discussed above, and

Some

the remote purchaser.

the material alteration theory.

According

therefore, the terms are not

other courts based their decisions""'

to that theory

on

"where an informal agreement

is

followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms
so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. "-°^
provisions do not materially alter the agreement, they will

according to

UCC

section 2-207.

However,

In the event that those

become

part

of the agreement

for the material alteration or vice versa,

express outcome of the intention of the other party

is

needed. This

is

absent

in the

an

"pass

through" warranties.

Since the manufacturer and the remote purchaser do not directly

deal with each other.

Some

other courts based their decisions""^ on the theory of lack of

negotiation. According to that theory, parties, especially "the remote purchaser lacked an

opportunity to negotiate directly over the terms of the exclusions, and furthermore their

decision based on the freedom of contract."'""

This also shows one of the main

characteristics of the "pass through" warranties that they are not negotiated warranties.

On

the other hand, theories in favor of the enforcement of the exclusions of

warranties were given as follows.
beneficiary theory, which

that theory

-^-

See

e.g.

e.g.

Old Albany

Estates. Ltd. v.

Honzons,

Inc.. v.

See

e.g.

R&L

Grain Co..

at

of the

UCC. According

v.

at

even though they did not take part

Highland Carpet Mills,

Inc.,

604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979).

Corp., 551 F.Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982).

475.

Chicago Eastern Corp., 531 F.Supp. 201 (N.D.

111.

to

to the

in the negotiation

472.

Avco

See Russell, supra note 197.
-""'

the section 2-318

and the decisions of the courts the exclusions of warranties are extended

See Russell, supra note 197,
See

courts based their decisions-"' on the third party

stemming from

is

vertical non-privity plaintiffs,

-°'

Some

1981).

50

Some

process.

which denotes
of warranties

other courts based their decisions-'* on the legislative mandate theory,

2-316 of the

that "section

UCC

in certain circumstances."-"'

provides for the exclusion or modification

In this connection,

"by adoptmg the section 2-

316, a state legislature has specifically granted sellers the privilege of excluding
warranties in their contracts with buyers."-"^

To

this end,

once a remote purchaser buys

the good, the exclusions of the warranties fall automatically within the scope of the

enforcement.

In other words, those exclusions are applicable

and enforceable

to the

remote purchasers.

THE REVISION OF ARTICLE

B.

1.

2

THE REVISION PROJECT

The UCC"'^ has been developed and continued

to be

revised by the two

organizations namely the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State

(NCCUSL)-'" and

the

American Law

Institute (ALl).-"

The ALI and

the

NCCUSL

Laws
have

been working on the revision of the Article 2 since the early 1990s.

In this context, "in

1990 a study group appointed by the permanent

UCC

editorial

board of

preliminary report and a drafting committee, appointed by the

and issued a

NCCUSL,

has begun

circulating preliminary drafts since technological and other changes in the nature and

-**

See

-"'

See Russell, supra note 197.

-

See

e.g.

e.g.

"UCC

IS

Western Equipment Co.
at

v.

Sheridan Iron Works.

Inc.,

605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).

479-80.

Russell, supra note 197, at 479.

the

main source of commercial law

in the

The UCC and the revisions to it are
Code only becomes the law of a respective state
has been adopted in some form in all fifty states.

United States.

presented to the state legislatures for adoption, and the

when It is adopted by that state's legislature. The UCC
The only exception is the state of Louisiana, which has not adopted the sales and leases article of the
UCC." See Henry D. Gabriel. The Inapplicability' of the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Tul.L.REv.
1995(1998).
For detailed mformation regardmg the

NCCUSL,

See Gabnel.

Id.

For detailed mformation regardmg the ALI. See Gabnel. supra note 209.
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performance of sales agreements confirm the need
the intent

to revise article 2."-'-

and the reason of the revision are "based on the ideas

In other words,

that the current

Code

is

not reflective of current business practices, particularly in areas such as consumer
protection, warranty, products liability and third party rights in sales contracts, as well as

emerging electronic modes of

contracting."-'^

Those views supplement and

revision because "the pace of economic, technical and legal change

American

society."-'^

very rapid

"The current Article 2 was drafted and operates within

established principles of the

a context

in

of

law of contracts. "" After a decade of efforts the

common

form of the proposed revision of the Article 2 was brought on the agenda of the

final

NCCUSL

in July

1

999.

However, due

to the industry opposition to

thought that there would be a difficulty

in the

meeting three modifications were made on the

November
draft,

1999,

which

will be

will

December 1999, March 2000
be discussed

approved by ALI

2.

in

in

some

sections,

uniform adoption by the

context, the July draft for the proposed revision of the Article 2

that

is

justify the

drafts.

was

In this

was withdrawn. After

final July draft.

The recent

states.

it

Those were

draft is the April

2000 ALI Annual Meeting. The hope

is

2000

that the project

2001.

NEW WARRANTY SECTIONS

During the revision process most important and controversial changes have been

made

in the

warranties section. In the proposed revision of the article 2 the express

-' Robert A. Hillman. Sales Law in Transition. CORNELL Law Forum. 16 (November 1995).
"'
See Gabnel. supra note 209, at 2001
'*
Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, lb LOY. L. A. L. REV. 683,
686(1993).

"The

sale

present form

of goods provisions of the
it

does not respond

Gabnel. supra note 209,

at

2003.

to

UCC

modem

has been in

its

electronic and

present form since 1958.

In this regard, in its

computer based business transactions." See

warranties, "pass through" and advertising were drafted in separate sections.

which are governing the

warranties,

section

is

limited in

its

Express

direct relations, are placed in section 2-313.

scope and direct purpose

to express warranties

and remedial

promises made by the seller to the immediate buyer as part of a contract for
present section deals with affirmations of fact or promises

made by

This

sale.

The

the seller, to the

immediate buyer, descriptions of the goods, or exhibitions of samples or models, exactly
as any other part of a negotiation

is

new and

new goods

which ends

in

a contract

is

dealt with.

Section 2-313

A

follows the case law and practice of extending a seller's obligations regarding

to

remote purchasers.

through" warranties.

It

Section 2-313

governs what are commonly called the "pass

B

is

also

new and

practice in extending a seller's obligations regarding

follows the case law and the

new goods

to

remote purchasers.

This section deals with obligations to a remote purchaser created through a

communication with the public, primarily through advertising.

In place to

medium

for

be current 2-

313, the revision will include these sections, which bring significant differences and
precise regulation to the privity issues, the concept of the basis of the bargain and the

remedial rights with regard to "pass through" and advertising warranties which have
effects

on the

third parties.

3.

The

SECTION

explicit treatment

2-313

A

of "pass through" warranties

is

in section

2-313

A

which

reads as follows:

Section 2-313

(a)

A

To Remote Purchaser Created By Record
Packaged With or Accompanying Goods,

Obligation

In this section:
( 1 )

"Goods" means new goods and goods sold or leased

as

unless the transaction of purchase does not occur normal chain of distribution.

new goods
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(2)

"Immediate Buyer" means a buyer

(3)

"Remote purchaser" means

that enters into a contract with

the seller.

an immediate buyer or other person
If a seller

(b)

a person that buys or leases goods from

normal chain of distribution.
or promise that relates

in the

makes an affirmation of fact

or provides a description that relates to the goods, or

makes

to the goods,

a remedial promise, in a

record packaged with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably expects the

record to be, and the record

is,

furnished to the remote purchaser, the seller has an

obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the affirmation of fact,

promise or description unless a reasonable person

would not believe
obligation,
(c)

It is

of

that the affirmation

and an obligation

to the

in the position

fact,

of the remote purchaser

promise or description created an

remote purchaser will perform the remedial promise.

not necessary to the creation of an obligation under this section that

words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or

have a
specific intention to undertake an obligation, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create an obligation.
the seller use formal

The following

(d)

that the seller

rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation

created under this section:
(

The

1

remote purchaser
later that the

if the

seller

may modify

modification or limitation

time of purchase or

if the

record that contains the affirmation of

is

ftimished to the remote purchaser no

modification or limitation

fact,

is

contained

in the

promise or description.

Subject to a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in breach

(2)
is

or limit the remedies available to the

liable for incidental or consequential

damages under section 2-715 but

the seller

is

not

liable for lost profits.

The remote purchaser may recover

(3)

seller's obligation arising

events as determined in any manner, which

An

(e)

as

damages

under subsection (b) the loss resulting

obligation that

is

is

for breach

in the ordinary

of as

course of

reasonable.

not a remedial promise

is

breached

if the

goods did

not conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or description creating the obligation

when

the

goods

left

the seller's control.

a)

To begin
warranty

is

'

with, in the proposed revision of article 2 the so-called "pass through"

named an

to identify the

"OBLIGATION RATHER THAN "WARRANTY"

change

"obligation" rather than an "express warranty".

that

through" under the current

2-313

A

will

make

in

crucial task

is

comparison with the treatment of "pass

article 2.

"The recognition of the remote warranty obligation

modem

The

marketing and distribution system

in

is

an acknowledgment of the

which the manufacturers give warranties

to

54

persons not in

comes with

Furthermore, "the recognition of these remote warranties also

privity.""'*

a recognition of the remote seller's ability to limit remedies and to curtail the

extension of the warranty to non-buyers, as well as providing a clear accrual rule for
bringing actions based upon the remote warranty."-'

'

Furthermore, as the "pass through"

deemed express warranties they were

warranties were

For example, one of the elements

express warranties.
basis of the bargain

In the

test.

also subject to the elements of

were subject

that they

proposed revision of

article 2 they

to

was

the

were named as

"obligation." In this context, in the proposed revision of article 2, the test of basis of the

bargain was eliminated.

The elements

are placed in the subsection (b).

that trigger the obligation

Those elements are an affirmation of

goods or a description

that relates to the

Those elements must be
must be furnished

to the

b)

under section 2-313

in a record

that relates to the

goods or

packaged with or accompanying the goods and they

remote purchaser.

CONFIRMATION: PRIVITY

a defense.

This

is

the express recognition

is

promise

a remedial promise.

IS

NOT REQUIRED

Another implication of drafting the "pass through" warranties
independent section

fact or

A

recognized in section 2-313

and confirmation

A

(a) (3)

in a

that lack

separate and

of privity

is

not

through defining "the seller" and

"the remote purchaser". This confirmation also eliminates the risk of remote purchaser's

recovery of damages
In this context, a

when

the intermediate seller

becomes insolvent or out of business.

remote purchaser, when the intermediate

seller

becomes insolvent or

out of business, can bring an action against the seller based on section 2-313

See Linda

J.

A

without

Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search

for Balance. 52 Smu. L. Rev. 1683, 1699-1700(1999).

' See Rusch, supra note 2

1

6, at

1

700.

is
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However, section 2-313

the requirement of privity.

beyond a remote purchaser

to the

does not allow an extension

donee or any voluntary transferee who

Unlike the practice under the present

lessee.

A

comment 2 of section

"The party

to

whom

the obligation runs under this section

than 'purchaser' in article

who

According

seller.

to the

2-3 1 3 A:

the goods, and thus the term 'remote purchaser'

voluntary transferee

not a buyer or

article 2 the third party other than the

remote purchaser cannot bring an action against a remote
preliminary

is

is

1.

is

used.

may

buy or lease
more limited
donee or any

either

The term

is

however, and does not include a

not a buyer or lessee. Moreover, the remote purchaser

of the normal chain of distribution for the particular product. That
chain will by definition include at least three parties and may well include morefor example, the manufacturer might sell first to a wholesaler, who would the

must be

part

A

buyer or lessee from
the retailer would qualify as a remote purchaser and could invoke this section
resell the

goods

to a retailer for sale or lease to the public.

against either the manufacturer or the wholesaler (if the wholesaler provided a

record to the retailer to be furnished to the ultimate party), but no subsequent
transferee, such as used-goods buyer or sublessee, could qualify.

The law

governing assignment and third-party beneficiary, including section 2-318, must
be consulted to determine whether a party other than the remote purchaser can
enforce an obligation created under this

section."-'**

Therefore, one can say that for the persons other than the remote purchaser,
sections other than 2-313

product

in the

A

is

applicable.

In other words, only the persons

normal distribution chain are entitled under

remote purchaser and sue the remote

seller

under

who buys

the

this section to qualify as

this section.

a

People other than the

remote purchaser can sue according to section 2-3 1 8 or other regulations.

The change from "express warranty"
rationale of the

economic

loss doctrine.

approach of the current case law.
there

-'*

was no bargain between

Amencan Law

(Apnl

14.

Institute.

It

to "obligation" creates tension

The revision embraces

can be said

the second analytical

that the drafters drafted the section as if

the remote purchaser

and the

seller.

Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article
2. at 64

2000). §2-313 A. cmt.

with the

Therefore, with

2. Sales.

this.

Discussion Draft
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all

statements about the good, which are written on a label or in a booklet and are

received with the good, create an obligation.

purchaser

totally

is

Therefore, there

is

unaware of the "pass through" warranties
no need

the basis of the bargain.

section 2-313 A,

The obligation

which

to establish reliance or to

exists

even

if the

remote

time of the purchase.

at the

prove that the statements are part of

This can be realized through the preliminary

comment

1

to

reads:

"No

direct contract exists

used

in this section."''*^

between the seller and the remote purchaser, and thus
the seller's obligation under this section is not referred to as an 'express
warranty.'
Use of "obligation" rather than 'express warranty' avoids any
inference that the basis of the bargain test is applicable here. The test for whether
an obligation other than a remedial promise arises is similar in some respects to
the basis of the bargain test, but the test herein is exclusive. Because 'remedial
promise' in Section 2-313 is not subject to the basis of the bargain test that term is

However, with the application of reasonable person standard a
this

presumption that the remote purchaser would not believe

promise or description did not create an obligation. In

seller

can rebut

that affirmation

this context,

one can say

seller

escapes responsibility for puffing under 2-31 3 A(c). According to

2-313

A

this,

of

fact,

that the

subsection

(b) provides:

"if a seller

makes an affirmation of

fact or

promise that

relates to the goods, or

provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise,

in a

record packaged with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably
expects the record to be, and the record
seller

is,

fiimished to the remote purchaser, the

has an obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the

affirmation of fact, promise or description unless a reasonable person in the
position of the remote purchaser

would not believe

that the affirmation

promise or description created an obligation, and an obligation

to the

of

fact,

remote

purchaser that the seller will perform the remedial promise."
This situation

:i4

Amencan Law

(Apnl

14.

is

Institute.

also mentioned in the preliminary

comment

Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article

2000), §2-313 A. cmt. I,at63.

5

of section 2-3 13 A:

2, Sales,

Discussion Draft
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"[T]he seller

is

entitled to shape the scope

language must be considered

in context.

If a

of the obligation, and the

reasonable person in the position of

the remote purchaser, reading the seller's language as a whole,
that

no

an affirmation of

liability

under

c)

fact,

seller's

would not believe

promise or description created an obligation, there

is

this section."""

RESTRICTION OF THE "PASS THROUGH"

WARRANTY PACKAGE
In the subsection 2-313 (A) (d) (I) limitations

According

are confirmed.

purchaser

The

purchase.

furnished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of

statutory language requires the furnishing of the restriction.

demand demonstrated agreement
view of these cases
that the "pass

can limit the remedies available to the remote

to this a seller

if the limitation is

to

them by the buyer.

restriction.

Bearing

The

limitation

is

in

mind

written in the warranty

opens the box of the good, she will not be aware of the

until she

Therefore,

can be said that there

is

limitation.

a possibility of unconscionable terms to be

over the remote purchaser, since there

is

imposed

an inequality of bargaining power between the

and the remote purchaser.

d)

In the subsection

profits.

ELIMINATION OF LOST PROFIT CLAIMS
2-313

A

(d) (2)

it

is

stated that the seller

is

not liable for the lost

Regarding the recovery of the damages, a remote purchaser

obligation

is

extended cannot recover consequential damages for loss of

Amencan Law
(Apnl

does not

through" warranties are comprehensive, obviously the remote purchaser

package and

seller

It

Thus, the revision adopts the

buyer by "pass through"

that bind the

will receive the limitation with the good.

it

on the "pass through" warranties

14. 2000). §

institute.

Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article
5. at 64

2-313 A. cmt.

2, Sales,

to

whom

profits.

the

The

Discussion Draft
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damages

drafters kept the consequential

in the

scope of recovery, however, they provide

a total insulation for loss profit claims. This seems to be a major change in existing law.

The buyer has no
right.

Under

loss profits

claim even though the buyer has not agreed

the present law "if there

of the express warranty
available the array of

to a

is

to

give up this

a failure of the essential purpose, the limitation

warranty of repair or replacement will

Code remedies."-' Section 2-715

is

fail

and the buyer has

one of the available remedies

under the revision, which governs the consequential damages resulting from the breach.

They

may

are available in addition to the incidental and difference in value damages.

ask

why

recovered.

It

—

the loss of profits

can be argued

sellers against the unlimited

only one particular form of economic loss

that section

2-313

A

~

balances the imposition of

cannot be

liability

on

scope of the loss of profits of the remote purchaser. In other

words, a remote seller cannot predict the scope of the usage of the product he
benefit to the remote purchaser.

the unexpected

One

sells or its

Therefore, one can say that the drafters tried to balance

and unrestricted amounts of

lost profits

through not allowing the remote

purchaser to recover the lost profits in the form of consequential damages. However, on
the other hand, lost profit

commercial consumer.

damages

are vitally crucial

For instance, Lewis

defense against the exclusion of

lost profits.

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held

"where a

seller provides

v.

goods

should

know
is

the remote purchaser

is

a

Mobil Oil Corp..-" provides a powerful
In this case, the

United States Court of

that:

to a

manufacturing enterprise with knowledge that

they are to be used in the manufacturing process,

profits

when

it

is

reasonable to assume that he

the defective goods will cause a disruption of production, and loss of

a natural consequence of such disruption.

be recoverable under those circumstances."—

"'
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30,
-- See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 438 F.2d 500
-^ See Mobil Oil Corp.. 438 F.2d. at 5 01

1

1

1

§ 7.04 [1], at 7-54.
(8"^ Cir.

1971

).

Hence, loss of profits should
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Therefore, one can say that subsection (d) (2) of section 2-313

from one aspect,
been

built

i.e.

from the consumer aspect. Therefore,

at least a

A

sees the problem

balance should have

between the consumer and the commercial consumers regarding

lost profits.

CHAPTER IV
ADVERTISING WARRANTIES

A.

REGULATION UNDER CURRENT ARTICLE

1.

2

CASE LAW RECOGNIZING ADVERTISING AFFIRMATIONS

AS EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In the

modem

era "for markets to operate effectively, buyers must have accurate

information about the quality and other characteristics of the products offered for sale.""^
In this connection, "with

mass marketing,

the manufacturer

purchaser, sales are accomplished through intermediaries and the

is

removed from the

demand

for products

is

created primarily by advertising media.""*

Statements

in advertising

which are found

to

be part of the basis of the bargain are

held by the courts to be express warranties under the present article 2 even though there

no

privity of contract

is

between the advertiser and the buyer and no negotiation between

these actors."*

-" See Richard a. Posner, Regulation of advertising

By The FTC Evaluation Study,
:

at 3

(1973).

See Note, 36 So. Cal. L. Rev. 291. 294.
-J'-''

Seee.g.

696. see

1

e.g.

T.V. Serv.

McDonnell & Coleman,
General Supply

Inc.. v.

&

supra note 30. § 5.01

Equip. Co.

Dressor Indus.

Inc..

v. Phillips.

586 F.2d 637

(advertising catalog descnbing T.V. tower); Taylor
in

(8'^

v.

mint condition with rebuilt engine).
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[2] at 5-4; Castelaz ei.al.,

supra note 33. at

§

App. 1972); Community
Cir), rehg denied. 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir. 1978)

490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.

Alfama 481 A. 2d 1059

Ct.

(Vt. 1984)(car advertised as
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Express warranties have been held

be created by the use of particular

to

statements in advertising with respect to automobiles and automobile accessories,"'

and hair preparations,"*^ equipment and machinery ,-^'^

batteries,"* cosmetics

preparations for agricultural use or for

purchaser

in

livestock,--'-

insulation,-^'

A

and sporting goods. -^^

remote

order to recover under an express warranty stemming from the advertising

warranties must establish that the manufacturer's advertisement contains an affirmation

of fact or description of goods, which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. However,

"where advertising
the

involved, especially in national media like television or magazines,

is

argument can thus be made

consumers

that

that there

is

such a high degree of skepticism

among

no reasonable person accepts the representation made as accurate product

may

information on which they

rely."-^"

some

"In

instances, the language of an

advertisement might be regarded merely as an affumation of the value of the advertised

-^ See

Hansen

e.g.

v.

Firestone Tire

Co. (1" Dist.)

&

Rubber Co. (CA 6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254

(6""

1960)

Cir.

nm

and had certain safety features); Ghema v. Ford Motor
246 Cal. App.2d 639. 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (advertisement that a certain kind of car was

(advertisement that certain

tires

would

fit

any

designed and built to give road performance required by the most exacting motonng enthusiasts); Scheuler
V.

Aamco

Transmissions.

transmission);

Funk

v.

Inc.,

Kan. App.2d 525. 571

1

48 (1977) (advertising as

P. 2d

to

automatic

Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp. (2d Dept.) 23 App. Div.2d 771, 258 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1965)

An automobile manufacturer's radio, television, magazine,
and newspaper advertisements extolling the virtues of its products are made for the ultimate purchasers
(advertisement of safety windshield on car).

who

use and

dnve

the products, and form part of the warranty that the manufacturer gives the ultimate

consumer. General Motors Corp.
other grounds by

Kyker

v.

v.

Dodson, 47 Term. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (disapproved on

General Motor Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 )( action for injury caused

by defective brakes.); see also Castelaz
--'

Westric Battery Co.

v.

-'^

See e.g. Spiegel v. Saks 34'^
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1964).
-^^
See e.g. KJein v. Sears Roebuck
-^\

Neville Constr. Co.

v.

et.al.

supra note 33.

Standard Electnc Co.
street,

&

(CA

at §

697.

10 Colo.) 482 F 2d 1307 (1973).

252 N.Y.S.2d 852, affd (2d Dept.) 26 App. Div.2d 660, 272

(CA4 Md) 773 F.2d 1421 (1985).
Vamish Co. (CA8 Neb.) 671 F.2d 107 (1982).
Amencan Cyanamid Co.. 21 Ga. 764, 88 S.E.2d 152, conformed

Cook

Paint

Co.

&

1

See e.g. Sawan, Inc.. v.
App. 598, 89 S.E.2d 565 (1955) (advertisement of seed
damaging germinative quality of seed).
1

-" Hauter

v.

to

92 Ga.

fumigant described as not injuring or

Zogarts, 14 Cal.3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681. 534 P 2d 377 (1975) (golf training device

'completely safe ball will not

Wayne

com

K. Lewis,

Representations. 47

hit player.");

See also Castelaz

ei.al..

supra note

Toward .A Theory of Strict 'Claim' Liability: Warranty Relief For .Ad\'ertising
OHIO Si. L.J. 671, 679 1986); m the same article it was also stated that "according
(

Newspaper Advertising Bureau, only 39% of viewers regard

TV

was

33, at 697.

ads as believable.",

n. 62.

to

goods or a statement purporting

to

be merely the advertiser's opinion or commendation

concerning the goods, and thus does not create a warrant)'."^"

In this context, a court

held that ''advertisements and promotional literature can be a part of the basis of the

bargain where they are prepared and furnished by a seller to induce the purchase of

its

product and the buyer relies on the representations."-^^

An

advertisement, catalog, or brochure can contain representations that constitute

an express warranty even when a warranty

is

not intended.-^'

In order to determine,

and

so as to provide a breach of warranty action to recover for injury caused by the product,

whether a statement

in

an advertisement amounts to a warranty of the advertised product

"depends on the circumstances, and the alleged warranty language of the advertisement
in

question and the context in which such language

Typically the advertiser of the product
that

used."-^*

LACK OF PRIVITY DOES NOT BAR ACTION

2.

company

is

is

some

the manufacturer or

does not have a contract with the ultimate buyer.

related

In this context,

advertising warranties can be described as "non-privity warranties" at least in the sense

that the advertiser

and the ultimate buyer do not manifest consent

Although the remote purchaser and the manufacturer whose good

"""

See Castelaz

et.al..

supra note 33,

at §

to the

is

same

contract.

advertised, have no

692.

"^^

See John R. Trentacosta. Article 2--Warranties and Warranty Disclaimers. 70 MiCH. B.
see also Cooper Paintings & Coatings v. SCM Corp.. 457 S.W.2d 864 (1970).

J.

278 (1991

).

107 (8'^ Cir. 1982); Sylvestn v. Warner
Cf. Neville Constr. Co.. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co.. 671 F.2d
Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Keith v. Buchanan. 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App.1985);
Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.. 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Hams v. Belton. 65 Cal.

--"

1

&

Rptr.

808 (Cal.

Ct.

App. 1968); Crest Container Corp.,

v.

R.H. Bishop Co.. 445 N.E. 2d 19

(111.

App.

Ct.

Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Randy Knitwear, Inc.. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181
N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1962); Rogers v. Tom Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958); Dner v.
Perfection. Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).
1982); Scheuler v. Aainco Transmissions. Inc., 571 P. 2d 48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977);

See Castelaz

et.al..

supra note 33,

at §

692.
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direct contractual relation, the

in the

advertisement.

Co.,-^^ the

remote purchaser

may

well rely on the express warranties

well-known Randy Knitwear

In the

Court of Appeals of New York declared

"[T]he world of merchandising

in brief,

is,

Inc.,

American Cyanamid

v.

that:

no longer a world of direct

contract;

it

world of advertising and when representations expressed and
in the mass communications media and on labels attached to the
goods themselves, prove false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason of
his reliance on those representations, it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's
denial of liability on the sole ground of the absence of technical privity.
Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals and other media to
call attention, in glowing terms, to the qualities and virtues of their products and
this advertising is directed at the ultimate consumer or at some manufacturer or
is,

rather, a

disseminated

supplier

who

is

not in privity with them.

made

purchaser's protection to warranties

The protection he

really needs

representations caused

him

to

him by

his

against the manufacturer

is

make

highly unrealistic to limit a

is

It

directly to

the purchase.

immediate

seller.

whose published

"-'*°

Express warranties created through mass media advertisements addressed to the
public are also captured perfectly in Terry

consumer

whom

Double Cola Bottling Company*^ as

v.

companies are trying to persuade when
buildings, and by every other known
advertising medium, that this cola and that crush are refreshing, delicious,
delightfully nonfattening, and just the drink for you. The consumer is their mark
even though the manufacturers have no direct contract with him. It is to shut
one's eyes and ears in today's world of advertising to say that, because no
reassuring words appear on the product's container, the manufacturer of
nationally advertised product has made no representation to the purchaser. He
makes one every day — sometimes every hour on hour. Any food entitled to
status as a famous name brand has been warranted by the manufacturer to the
consumer — very probably in color - in magazines, on billboards, and by
glamorous stars of stage and screen over radio and television."-''"[I]t is the

the bottling

they proclaim in neon lights from atop

Since "the rationale
the products by

-^"^

Randy Knitwear

is

that the advertiser has,

making claims about

Inc., v.

tall

Amencan Cyanamid

by

their quality

Co..

1

1

N.Y.2d

5,

its

actions, created the market for

and performance

181 N.E.2d 399,

226 N.Y.S.2d 363

(1962).
-"^^

-^'

-*-

See Randy Knin^ear

Inc.. 11 N.Y.2d at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d
Double Cola Bonling Co.. 263 N.C.
38 S.E.2d 753
964).
See Double Cola Bottling Co.. 263 N.C. at 13, 138 S.E.2d 761.

See Terry

v.

1

.

1

( 1

at

that induce

367-68.
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consumers

to

manufacturer,

purchase them"-^\ a remote purchaser,

who

advertises his product through

non-privity basis for breach of warranty.

upon

the market

upon

his representations

mass media, can bring an action on the

and warranting through advertising
and purchase the goods.
in the

mass media and consequently he cannot avoid

Henningsen

v.

Bloomfield Motors

made no

Co..'^- the

made

to public through

"when

the expected

Supreme Court of

by

to rely

contract directly with the

New

the manufacturers to

members of the

the existence of express warranties

consumer

goods

cannot be said that a

his responsibilities,

the purchase of their goods from the dealers by

upon which

it

advertisement

indicated that "with the advent of large scale advertising

in placing his

to induce the

is

Therefore,

use leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he
In

not in privity with the

is

The manufacturer's aim

manufacturer had no intention of warranting

user.""^

who

Jersey

promote

public, provided a basis

was predicated, even though

the

manufacturer was not a party to the contract of sale."-'**
Furthermore, in Semowich

v.

R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co.r^^ the court decided

advertisements concerning Vantage cigarettes, which were published

in the

that

various issues

of "Parade", "Penthouse", "Playboy", "Life", and "Look" magazines, and which

commented on

the Vantage's "great taste" and low tar and contained the Surgeon

General's warning about the effects of smoking, created an express warranty. In Rogers

V.

Toni

Home Permanent

Co.,-*^ the

Supreme Court of Ohio held

that "a

consumer could

sue the manufacturer of a product for breach of express warranties arising from published

-"'

See Lewis, supra note 234,

-*^

See Rand}- Knihxear

678
986).
N.Y.2d at 13. 181 N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
-*'
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co.. 32 N.J. 358. 161 A.2d 69 1960).
-^ See Bloomfield Motor Co.. 32 N.J. at 372-73. 161 A.2d at 77.
-" Semowich v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 1988 WL 123930 (N.D.N. Y. 1988).
-^*'
Rogers v. Tom Home Permanent Co.. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
at

(

1

Inc.. II

(
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advertisements, although no privity of contract existed between the consumer and the

Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio added that "the warranties

manufacturer."-""

made by

and by the

the manufacturer in his advertisements

labels

on his products are

inducements to the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought
accountability to any

and

consumer who buys

later suffers injury

the product in reliance

to

be held to

on such representations

because the product proves to be defective or deleterious."-'"

who

Therefore, one can say that according to this decision an injured consumer

upon

the express warranty to his detriment can recover even though there

privity of contract

Jiffee

Chemical

strict

between him and the manufacturer. One step

Corp.,--^

it

was held

is

further, in

relies

no direct

Drayton

that "television advertisements that product

v.

was

"safe" and capable of "fast action", which representations the purchaser allegedly relied

on,

were properly considered express warranties as

contact."^-

According

to this case warranties

to safety

made

in the

of the product for human
advertisement to public

through mass media can create an express warranty. Furthermore, a consumer

who

relies

on the advertisement can bring an action against the manufacturer on a non-privity basis
for the breach

of express warranty.--'

In all of these decisions

recognized the right of the remote purchaser

who

manufacturer to sue on the non-privity basis.
directly

on a non-privity basis

to a

relied

one can say

on the advertising warranty of the

In brief, a buyer

manufacturer

who

that courts

may

bring an action

advertised his products through

mass media and make an express warranty.

-""

See

--^

See Toni

;'

"
-"

F.

Tom Home Permanent

Co.. 167

Home Permanent

Co.. 167

Ohio
Ohio

St. at

249. 147 N.E.2d at 615.

249, 147 N.E.2d at 61 5.
Chemical Corporation. 591 F.2d 352 (6'^ Cir. 1978).
See Jiffee Chemical Corp.. 591 F.2dat352.
.As a supplement to those decisions m Omaha Pollution Control Corp.. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp.. (413
Supp. 1069 (1976)) it was referred to Hawkins Construction Co.. v. Matthews Co... (190 Neb. 546, 209

See Drayton

v. JifTee

St. at
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3.

IMPORTANCE OF BUYER RELIANCE ON MEDIA

ADVERTISING
Although the courts debate whether demonstrated reliance on the warranty
affirmation by the claimant buyer

is

generally required for an express warranty

decisions dealing with public advertising

A

reliance requirement.

seem

typical judicial statement

may

statement regarding a product

to place particular

is:

"assuming

that

action,-'"*

emphasis on the

an advertisement's

be regarded as an express warranty, a person injured

by the product cannot recover from the advertiser on the ground of breach of express
warranty without showing reliance on the statement
according to American Tobacco Co.
section 2-313

relating the

is

Inc.,

v.

Grinnell

available where the seller

-^'^

in question.

"-"'

Furthermore,

an express warranty claim under

makes an affirmation of

fact or

promise

goods sold which becomes the basis of the bargain, thereby inducing reliance

on the part of the buyer. The defendant, a tobacco company, won summary judgment as
against the plaintiffs claims for breach of express warranty as well as fraud, fraudulent

concealment and negligent misrepresentation by proving conclusively
not rely upon the advertisements in question in choosing to

and the plaintiff admitted

N.W.2d 643 (1973)) and

it

smoke defendant's

that he did not see the advertisement.

was decided

advertismg warranty even though he

is

that a

manufacturer or seller

that plaintiff did

may be

Torres

v.

cigarettes

Northwest

held liable under such an

not in pnvity of contract with the purchaser.

Chemical Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964); Connolly v.
v. Kellner, 451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio App. 1982); see
e.g. Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C.. Inc.. 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552. (1979), in which it was stated that "the
element of reliance need not always be expressly alleged, it can often be inferred from allegations of mere
-'''See e.g.. Ball v. Mallinkrodt

Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963); Jones

purchase or use

if the natural

tendency of the representations made

is

such as

to

induce such purchase or

259 S.E.2d at 557 n.7; Hawkins Construction Co., v. Matthews Co.. 190 Neb.
546, 564-66, 209 N.W.2d 643. 654-55 (1973), holding that distribution of an advertising brochure with

use." 298 N.C. at 501 n. 7,

express representations about the product sufficed for a finding of express warranty.
---

See

(CA

e.g.

Gardner

v.

Q.H.S..

Inc..

6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254 (1960);

(CA4 SO 448 F.2d 238 1971 Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. (2d Dist.) 255 Cal. App.2d
(

);

806. 63 Cal.Rptr. 454(1967).
-•'*'

Sff

Amencan Tobacco

Co.

Inc.. v.

Gnnnell. 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1998).
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show

Engineering^-' joins those opinions in holding that a buyer need not

reliance in

that

where a

buyer claims an express warranty based on advertising, the evidence must show

that the

However, the court does not conclude

order to create an express warranty.

buyer read the advertisement.

The presumption of warranty recognized
to statements

made by

in

comment

the seller "during a bargain".

3 to section 2-313

Thus,

it

is

is

limited

possible to argue that

media advertising does not quality as being made "during a bargain" and

is

not entitled to

a presumption of warranty, therefore, requiring the buyer to demonstrate reliance, which

is

distant in time

and place. White and Summers support

this

view

stating that:

"one would not regard an advertisement as being made during a bargain and
therefore no statement in an advertisement would normally qualify for the
presumption that may be authorized in comment 3. At a minimum a plaintiff in
such a case should have to testify that he or his agent knew of and relied upon the
advertisement in making the purchase."*^*
In this regard.

White and Summers "interpret the comment

only to face-to-face dealings that occur while the deal

is still

as being applicable

warm."-''^

Briefly one can

say that their view supports a reliance approach for the creation of an express warranty.
Actually, this interpretation

taken into consideration.

is

correct

However,

when
if

the philosophy of the drafting of the

UCC

is

a remote buyer does not see the advertisement

addressed to the public, one can say that she will also be subject the express warranty
represented on the advertising material, since a manufacturer advertises his product in the

mass media with

the

knowledge and

the intention that they will be read

by the public. In

other words, one can say that the manufacturer assumes the responsibility to be sued by

Northwest Engineenng. 86 Haw. 383. 949 P.2d 1004

See Torres

v.

:5«

See White

& Svmmers supra note

254

See Chad R. Brown, An Analysis of the Interpretation of the "Basis of the Bargain
COM. L. J. 316. 322 (1999).

Section 2-313. 104

(Ct.

App. 1998).

10, § 9-5. at 353.
"

Language of
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who

the remote purchaser,

mass media but affected by

has not read the advertisement addressed to the pubhc in the
the defective product.

brought against the manufacturer
the public in the

mass media and

who makes

warranties in the advertising addressed to

privity will not be a bar

warranties arising out of advertising.

when

dealing with the express

Furthermore, one can say that lack of privity will

not be a bar for recovery where only economic loss

4.

Therefore, a non-privity action can be

is

involved

RELATIONSHIP OF ADVERTISING TO FORMAL

WARRANTY DOCUMENTS
Another aspect of the advertising warranties addressed

media

is

that they are non-negotiated.

Instead, "they arise

to the public

through mass

from affirmations or promises

contained in advertising pitched broadly to numerous potential customers."-^ Therefore,
the

consumer has no chance

to negotiate

advertisement addressed to the public

in

over the terms of the warranty made

mass media.

in

Furthermore, advertising

warranties are non-comprehensive since in the advertisement the manufacturer does not

on the warranty such as exclusion of consequential damages.

set out the limitations

attempt to state those limitations

may be made

An

as part of the ultimate sale either through

use of a negotiated contract or a "pass through" warranty document. Issues arise as to the

relationship

is

between the advertising and the formal warranty document. At

crucial to determine whether the statements in the advertising

the sales brochure, the catalog or the warranty

~ which

this point,

it

are seen before

package received with the product

—

are

binding and constitute a basis of the bargain independent of the formal warranty, and

whether there

is

a difference

See Adler. supra note

5

1

.

at

457.

between the advertising warranty and the written warranty,
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which

is

does not

received

in itself

later.

In this context, "the presence of a formal warranty

preclude separate recognition of informal warranty."-"' But

may invoke

time specific clauses in the formal warranty document

rule

and thereby prevent the informal statements

that are

made

According

or delivery of the warranty from being effective.-"

document

at the

same

the parol evidence

before or after execution

to

one view, "given the

capacity of informal and formal warranties to coexist, a critical role of an informal
express warranty

is

to amplify or explain the statements in the formal

the disadvantage of the seller."-"'

warranty often to

In this connection, "informal statements in advertising

and sales presentation may amplify the carefully structured language of formal

commitments, and provide means by which a
losses"-*^

cases.

In the case

For instance,

law development

in

this situation

Community TV Service

TV

contract stated precisely that a

frustrated

buyer can recover economic

has been reflected

Inc., v.

Dresser Indus.

in a variety

Inc.,'^-

tower could stand pressure of 60

of

the formal

Ibs/sq.

foot.

Advertising indicated that the tower would safely withstand winter wind and ice loads.

The tower was judged by whether
buyer recovered judgment for $

1

.2

it

performed up

million.

to the standard

In Select Port Inc.,

the formal contract described pigs being sold simply as

described this strain as the

like {i.e., specific

gilt

pathogen

of the

free).

fijture,

1

1

& Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05.
-" McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, 5.05.
§
-"'
Community TV Service Inc.. v. Dresser Indus. Inc..
1

"Midwestern

at

5-60.

at

5-60.

In Ricwil, Inc.,

Select Port Inc.,

v.

Babcock Swine

Inc..

Advertising

which

is

SPF

586 F.2d 637

640 F.2d 147

v.

S.L.

Pappas

5.09.

(g"" Cir.),

(8"'Cir. 1978).
-""

Gilt."

Inc.,-^

Buyer obtained an award of $ 352, 700 based on

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05. at 5-60.
McDONNELL & COLEMAN. 5wpro note 30, §

"- See generally
-" 1 McDonnell

Babcock Swine

a product of 3 pureline strains

breach of the warranty created by the advertisement.

-"'

v.

of the advertising and

(8"' Cir.

1981).

reh

g

denied, 586 F.2d 637

&
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Co.r''^ a

product brochure advertising "Pre-insulated Piping System for Buried Hot and

Chilled Water Domestic Hot Water and Condense Lines to 250 °F" expressly warranted

that the pipe

would withstand water temperatures

limited to a repair

Whether

to

250 degrees; the warranty was not

commitment.

the written contract bars proof of an express warranty based on

promotional materials under the parol evidence rule
discussion of this issue appears in In re

Lone Star

is

a crucial issue.

Industries-^.

An

important

This case was brought by

railroad entities as a result of the premature cracking and deterioration of concrete

railroad ties.

The

the traditional

expensive

ties

The court

plaintiffs alleged that they

wood

ties,

and

that

Lone

were reluctant

Star persuaded

to

buy concrete, rather than

them

to agree to the

more

through promotional material emphasizing long-life and low maintenance.

replied that the full actual record must be developed before

determined whether the written contract was the complete integration of the
"If after full factual background

it

can be

agreement.-*'''

developed, the court admits the promotional

is

material, the representations contained therein

may

well simplify the formal

written contract between the railroads and

Star.

The manner

Lone

in

which

the

courts either permit or deny amplification depending on the particular facts of the

transaction illustrates the search for bargain in fact which article 2
to encourage."

A

second issue concerning the relationship of advertising affirmations

formal warranty documents

document

-"'

was designed

-™

will apply

when

is

whether the

the action

liability limitation features

to the

of the formal

brought based on the separate advertising

is

Inc.. v. S.L Poppas & Co.. 599 So.2d
126 (Ala. 1992).
Lone Star Industries lib F.Supp. 206 (D.Md. 1991
''
The court noted that in Community T V Services Inc.. v. Dresser Indus. Inc.. (586 F.2d 637 (8"" Cir.)
reh 'g denied. 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir. 1978)). it was the jury decided that promotional matenal amplified the
''*'

See Ricwil.

1

In re

McDonnell & Coleman, supra note
McDonnell & Coleman, supra note 30, § 5.05, at 5-63.

wntten agreement, see
'"
1

).

1

30, § 5.05. at 5-62.
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affirmation.

number of

The warranty package included

formal document will typically have a

protective provisions for the warrantor including such matters as notice

requirements, exclusions of consequential

The present case law seems

suit.

in the

liabilities

and time requirements

to say very little about this issue.

visualize the advertising as an independent warranty.

It is

It

for bringing

possible to

is

also possible to visualize the

formal warranty contract as amending or supplementing the earlier warranty affirmation

of the advertising. In

reality

the formal warranty contract

should control.

On

it

seems the contractual relationship develops over time.
expressly negotiated, a strong case can be

is

the other hand, if the formal

through" warranty, one

is

document

is

made

that

If

it

a non-negotiated "pass

presented with another illustration of the problem of the

"rolling contract", the status of

which remains unclear

in

contemporary contract law and

has troubled the article 2 revision process.
In an action against the

medical

tests, the

manufacturer of a product used

court stated "the

trial

upon

where the physician

the brochure, but

standard

is

to identify

in its sales

brochure, warranted the

stated that he used the product in reliance, not

upon experience. "''

that advertisements,

performing certain

court did not err in directing a verdict for

defendant on plaintiffs charge that the defendant,
safety of the product,

in

However, "the

difficulty of the reliance

which may create an express warranty, are often

difficult

due to the vast number of advertisements and the time which may pass before

a buyer actually purchases a good."'"- Because, advertising warranties are addressed to
the general public, remote purchaser sees the advertisement before she buys the product

and

in a different

Ball V. Mallinkrodt
J"'

place than that of the ultimate sale transaction.

In this connection, "the

Chemical Works. 53 Term. App. 218. 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).

See Brown, supra note 259.

at

320.

problem with the reliance approach

may

buyer, he

is

that if the

burden of proving reliance

is

on the

not recover because of the difficulty of tracing his reliance to the

Comment

advertisement."-'^

3 to the

2-313 leaves open the case where the buyer only

reads a brochure or advertisement about a product and does not bargain or negotiate. At

this point

it is

worth mentioning

that "the confusion

is

and relied on the representations

read, understood,

whether the reliance

whether the consumer must have

in

advertisements and the key

in advertisements is necessary."-^"

Finally, the advertised product

must have a relation

advertising material. Regarding that issue

it

was

Warranties

used on the

to the statements

stated that:

"[MJanufacturers' mass media advertising warranties
a warranty

is

is

admissible in evidence as

buyer can link the ads with the automobile purchased.
have been useful in breaking the privity barrier which

if the

in advertising

manufacturers use

in

defending themselves against damage

the manufacturer has advertised

its

automobile

to

For example,

suits.

be trouble

free,

economical

operation, and built with high quality workmanship, the manufacturer
difficulty arguing that

its

written warranty

is

if

in

may have

limited to repair of defective

parts.""-

The court

in Inglis

v.

American Motors

Corp.-'^ said that just such advertised

promises permitted the buyer to recover damages from the manufacturer
diminution

made

in

in

value of the automobile caused by latent defects. In

seller's talk

earlier,

statements

statements in the form of

and puffing are not deemed as an express warranty.

"''^

See BrowTi. supra note 259,

at

320.

*

See BrowTi. supra note 259,

at

322.

Roger

New York,

form of

defendant's advertising to the effect that a boat was of high quality do not create

an express warranty under 2-313 because, as mentioned

"'

in the

D. Billings, Jr.,

-^^

In other words, the

Handling Automobile Warranty and Repossession Cases,

at § 6.7

(1992).

""

Amencan Motors Corp.. 3 Ohio St.2d 132. 32 Ohio Op.2d 136. 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
Simone v. Genmar Indus. Inc., 1989 A.M.C. 2627. 2629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) "holding that advertising
that boat was of 'uncompromising quality" and 'skillfully crafted and integrated' did not create express
warranty that boat was seaworthy and soundly manufactured."
Inglis V.

-'^

Cf.
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"puffing" limitation on the creation of express warranties fully applies to advertising
warranties.

In short, advertising warranties are subject to section 2-313 of the

therefore constitute an express warranty.

They can be found

in the

Code, and

mass media, catalogs

and brochures. Therefore, the statements on the advertisement constitute the statements
of the manufacturer and create an express warranty directed
Technically, there

Nonetheless,

is

if the

remote purchaser sees the advertisement or does not see the
it,

she can sue the manufacturer on the basis of the breach of

express warranty in the event that there

is

a defect on the product.

THE REVISION OF ARTICLE

Section 2-313

B

is

new and

seller's obligations regarding

2

follows the case law and the practice in extending a

new goods

to

remote purchasers. This section deals with

obligations to a remote purchaser created through a

public, primarily through advertising.

in section

2-313

B which

Section 2-313

(a)

remote purchasers.

no bargain between the manufacturer and the remote purchaser.

advertisement yet relies on

B.

to the

B

The

medium

for

communication with the

explicit treatment of advertising warranties

is

reads as follows:

Obligation to Remote
Communication to Public

Purchaser

Created

By

In this section:

(1)

purchase that occurs
(2)

or leased as new goods
normal chain of distribution.

"Goods" means new goods sold
in the

"Immediate buyer" means a buyer

in a transaction

of

that enters into a contract with the

seller.

(3)

"Remote purchaser" means

(b)

If a seller

goods from an
normal chain of distribution.

a person that buys or leases

immediate buyer or other person

makes an affirmation n of

in the

fact or

promise that relates

to the goods, or

provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise in
advertising or a similar communication to the public and the public and the

74

remote purchaser enters into a transaction of purchase with knowledge of and
with the expectation that the goods will conform to the affirmation of fact,
promise or description or that the seller will perform the remedial promise, the
seller has

an obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the

affirmation of fact, promise or description unless a reasonable person in the

would not believe that the affirmation of fact,
promise or description created an obligation, and an obligation to the remote

position of the remote purchaser

purchaser that the seller will perform the remedial promise.
(c)

It is

not necessary to the creation of an obligation under this section that the seller

use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that the seller have a
specific intention to undertake an obligation, but an affirmation merely of the

value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or

(d)

commendation of the goods does not create an obligation.
The following rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation created
under

this section:

The

(1)

may modify

seller

purchaser

if the

or limit the remedies available to the remote

modification or limitation

furnished to the remote

is

The modification

purchaser no later than the time of purchase.
limitation

may be

or

furnished as part of the communication that contains the

affirmation of fact, promise or description.

Subject to a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in breach

(2)

liable for incidental or consequential

damages under

is

section 2-715 but the

seller is not liable for lost profits.

The remote purchaser may recover

(3)

as

damages

for breach of a seller's

obligation arising under subsection (b) the loss resuhing in the ordinary

course of events as determined

An

in

any manner, which
is breached

is

reasonable.

goods did not
conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or description creating the obligation when
the goods left the seller's control.
(e)

obligation that

In the

March

is

not a remedial promise

draft, in section 2-3

American Cyanamid

Co.,'^'*

13B

was adopted.

liability after

Again

engaging

in section

in a

Randy Knitwear,

In that case, the court overruled

decisions requiring privity on the ground that

avoid

the approach of

if the

it

was

Inc.,

its

Randy

(1962)

Kjiitwear, Inc.. v.

heavy advertising campaign.

2-313 B, the term "obligation" was used instead of "express

Amencan Cyanamid

Co..

1

1

prior

unrealistic to allow a manufacturer to

warranty." The elements that trigger the "obligation" arising out of advertising

-"'

v.

N.Y.2d

5,

226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399
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made

warranties

to the public are the affirmation

of fact or promise that relates

goods, or a description provided by the advertiser seller or the remedial promise

to the

made

in

advertising or in a similar communication to the public.

There are two defenses

of 2-313

B

(b)

can be raised by the

reasonable person

test

which was drafted as "reasonable person ...would not believe" and

the

puffing defense of 2-313

According

to the

B

that

seller: the

(c).

reasonable person defense, a buyer

who wishes

an

to enforce

advertised promise must prove that the buyer had an expectation that the goods would

conform

One can

to the advertised promise.

material are

product.

made with

say that the statements in the advertising

the purpose to induce the remote purchaser to

In this regard,

it

can be said that

it

is

illogical to

buy the advertised

allow a seller to decline the

responsibility advertised as promises or representations about

its

product due to the

reason or assumption that a remote purchaser cannot prove which advertisement she saw
or because the remote purchaser's sale

purchaser,

A
(c).

who

also

was influenced by

second defense

According

to the

the seller's opinion or

in favor

was induced by

a person other than the remote

the advertised promise.

of the seller

is

the puffing defense drafted in 2-3 1 3

B

language of this subsection, a "statement purporting to be merely

commendation of

the

goods does not create an obligation." One

can say that advertising materials are carefully drafted; therefore, the chances that the
statements in the advertising materials are seller's talk
the other hand,

seller to

it

can be argued that

escape from the

comment

liability

3 to section 2-313

B

it

this

defense

is

is

logically out of question.

On

a pro-seller defense, which enables the

due

to certain statements

was

stated that the purchaser

used

in the advertising.

In the

must have a knowledge of

76

and must have an

the affirmation of fact, promise, description or remedial promise

expectation that the goods will conform or the seller will comply.
subjective, while the reasonable person test in subsection (b)

In other words, according to

comment

is

This

test is entirely

objective in nature.

B

3 to section 2-313

"the seller will incur no liability to the remote purchaser

a) the

if:

purchaser did

not have knowledge of the seller's statement at the time of purchase; b) the

remote purchaser knew of the

time of purchase but did

seller's statement at the

not expect the goods to conform or the seller to comply; c) a reasonable person in
the position

of the remote purchaser would not believe

that the seller's statement

created an obligation (this test does not apply to remedial promises), or d) the
seller's statement

is

puffing."-^''

In subsection 2-313 (d) (1) the availability of the limitation

remedies are

set forth.

Under

the language of this subsection,

the possibility of limiting or modifying the remedies

it

and the modification

can easily be seen that

were given

to the seller if the

modification or limitation was fiimished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of
the purchase.

limitations.

As with "pass throughs"

it

is

not required that the buyer agree to these

However, a "pass through" document presented

the advertising warranty.

Advertising warranties are

made

after the

in a

purchase can limit

remote time and place.

Therefore, the risk of "pass throughs" limitation of the advertising warranties arises.
other words,

when

the remote purchaser buys the goods after she sees the advertisement,

the limitations in the warranty

advertising material.

the revision in that

commitment by

package or

Section 2-313

it

B

in the label

(d) (1)

may be

can limit the language used
the

most important subsection of

may

clearly establishes that advertisers

the formal warranty

in the

document introduced

at

limit advertising

or before the time of

purchase.

'

Amencan Law

(Apnl

14.

In

Institute.

Unifoim Commercial Code [New] Revised Article

2000). § 2-313 B. cmt.

3. at 68.

2. Sales.

Discussion Draft
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Section 2-313

party beneficiaries.

B

does not deal with the extension of the obligation

This was

beneficiaries of warranties.

left to

to certain third

section 2-318, which deals with the third party

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this thesis,

UCC

article 2, the

one of the most controversial parts of the proposed revision of the

"pass through" and advertising warranties, had been examined. In the

course of the examination
the present article 2

first

a general overview regarding the express warranties under

was presented.

Next,

we

explored the regulations of the "pass

through" and advertising warranties under the present

article 2

and

their regulation

under

the proposed revision of article 2.

Under

the proposed revision of article 2 the drafters planned to impose

regulations regarding the "pass through" and advertising warranties.
implications arose out of those regulations. Those

new

Naturally,

new

new

regulations and their implications

can be summarized as follows:

With

the proposed revision of article 2

it

was confirmed

that the privity

was not

required anymore, since the "pass through" and advertising warranties were recognized
separately and expressly in article

2.

It

was recognized

that a

remote purchaser can sue a

manufacturer based on the ground that the manufacturer has breached

stemming from the section 2-313

However, contrary

A

its

obligation

or section 2-313 B.

to the basic

concept that warranties are contractual, the

terminology of the sections are changed. "Obligation" rather than "express warranty"
used.

Use of

is

the term "obligation" rather than "warranty" suggests that the underlying

nature of the liability

is

not contractual.

Perhaps the

78

liability

should be considered to be

79

in tort or to

The

be statutory, but

it

does not seem to

rest

imposed automatically based on

liability is

on

a traditional

agreement process.

acts of the seller {e.g.

making an

affirmation that runs with the goods, providing a description of the goods in the

advertising).

At

The

the

These

acts are not required to be part of the basis of the bargain.

same

time, the revision allows the warrantor to adhesively limit

limitation of the remedies

is

also another controversial provision.

its liability.

In the subsection

2-313 (A) (d) (1) limitations on the remedy for the "pass through" warranties are
confirmed. According to this rule, a seller can limit the remedies available to the remote
furnished to the remote purchaser no later than the time of

purchaser

if the limitation is

purchase.

The agreement of the remote purchaser

not required.

Arguably,

this

to the

terms of the warranty package

is

provision allows the warrantor to impose remedial

limitations unfairly. Advertising warranties are drafted similarly. Advertising warranties

drafted in 2-313

subsection 2-313

remedy

B

B

are

made

in a

However, according

remote time and place.

(d) (1), the "pass through" terms or other

for the advertising warranty if they are furnished

documents may

no

later

to

limit the

than the time of

purchase. This provision can also create an unfair result against the remote purchaser.

Another new statutory protection
through" warranties can produce a

made

for the warrantor

lost profit claim.

is

that advertising

The end

result

is

and "pass

that the

buyer

is

the beneficiary of a statutory obligation despite the lack of a privity but the

warrantor can

restrict its liability to the

remote purchaser for violating

that obligation.

im LIBRARY
«N!VE!iSITYCF GEORGIA

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS AND TREATISES
•

John Howard and James Hulbert, Advertising and the Public

•

Jules

•

James White and Robert Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (5th

•

Douglas

J.

•

Clayton

P. Gillette

•

William H. Lawrence and William H. Henning, Understanding Sales and Leases of

Backman, Advertising and Competition

( 1

967)

Whaley, Problems and Materials on Commercial
and Steven D. Walt, Sales

Interest (1973)

Law

Law Domestic and

ed. 2000).

(2nd ed. 1990).
International

(

1

999)

Goods (1996)
•

American Law of Warranties (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan

•

Julian

B.

McDonnell and Elizabeth

J.

eds. 1991

).

Coleman, Commercial and Consumer

Warranties (1998).
•

Samuel Williston, Williston on Sales (Mary Anne Foran

ed. Clark,

Boardman,

Common Law

and Under

ed.,

5'*^

Callaghan eds 1996)
•

Samuel Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods
the

Uniform Sales Act

(rev. ed. 1948).

Law

•

Robert Nordstorm,

•

Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series

•

Douglas

J.

at

of Sales

Whaley,

( 1

970)

Warranties

80

( 1

984).

and

the

Practitioner (1981).

•

Roger D.

Billings, Jr.,

Handling Automobile Warranty and Repossession Cases

(1992).

•

Richard A. Posner, Regulation of Advertising by the FTC: Evaluation Study (1973)

ARTICLES
•

Anthony

T.

Kronman. Paternalism and

the

Law of Contracts, 92 Yale

L.J. 763, at

770(1983).
•

Batya Goodman, Honey,

I

Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap

Agreement As An Adhesion Contract, 21 Cardozo
•

John

L.

Debra

Rev. 319,

Amabile, Business and Commercial Litigation

72, Warranties, 5

•

L.

Bus.

L. Goetz,

Transactions:

An

et.al..

Kimberly Castelaz

•

Robert

et.al.,

328 (1999).

Federal Courts, Chapter

LiTlG. FED. Cts. S. 72.4

Special Project: Article

Update, 72

•

S.

& Com.

in

at

CORNELL

Products

Adler, The Last Best

L.

Rev.

Liability;

1

Two Warranties

159,

1

In

Commercial

170 (1987).

63 AM. JUR. Prod.

L., §

683 (1996).

Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express

Warranties: "Real World" Consumers

Don

't

Read

Warranties, 45 S.C.L. REV. 429,

437-38(1994)
•

Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
There A Reliance Requirement?, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 468, 472 (1991

•

Charles A. Heckman, Reliance or

Common

Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform

L.

•

Is

).

Honesty of Speech: The History^ and

Commercial Code,

38,

Case W. Res.

Rev. 1,39 (1987

Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting The Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of

Breach In Non-Privit\' Contexts, 66 N. C.

L.

Rev. 107,

at

135 (1987)

82

•

John

E.

Wm. & Mary

Murray, The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35

L.

Rev. 1447, 1494(1994)
•

Richard E. Speidel, Article 2: Highlights of the Proposed Revisions: Contract
Formation, Consumer Protection, Warranties. S.D. 30 ali-Aba 407.

•

D. Brit Nelson, Is Privity

Still

Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers

426

Required In a Breach of Express Warranty Cause of

Action For Personal Injury Damages?, 43
•

at

'

Baylor L. Rev.

55

1

,

at

553

Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75

99 1

( 1

).

Wash. U.

L. Q.

357,360(1997)
•

Donald

Two
•

F. Clifford,

Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase,

Relationships, 75

Wash.

U. L. Q. 413 (1997)

Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers

Under

the

UCC: Warranty

Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

Requirement
•

Dean

in the

Non-privity Context, 47 U. PiTT. L. Re\'. 873,

Russell, Enforcing Manufacturers

'

at

and

the Notice

891 (1986)

Warranty Exclusions Against Non-privity

Commercial Purchasers: The Need For Uniform Guidelines, 20 Ga.

L.

Rev. 461,

at

462(1986).
•

Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay

in

Reconstruction, 96

Harv.

L.

Rev.

1173,1209(1983).
•

Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of

Goods as a Model for

the Revision of Article

Two of

the

Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Tul.L.Rev. 1995 (1998).
•

Robert A. Hillman, Sales
1995).

Law

in Transition,

CORNELL Law Forum,

16

(November

83

•

Julian B.

Rev. 683, 686(1993).

L. A. L.

•

Linda

McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26 LOY.

J.

Rusch,

A

History

and Perspective of Revised Article

Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 Smu.
•

Wayne

K. Lewis,

L.

2:

The Never Ending

Rev. 1683, 1699-1700 (1999)

Toward A Theory of Strict 'Claim'

Liability: Warrant}- Relief For

Advertising Representations, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 679 (1986)
•

John R. Trentacosta, Article 2~Warranties and Warranty Disclaimers, 70 MiCH. B.

J.

278(1991)
•

Chad

R.

Brown, An Analysis of the Interpretation of the "Basis of the Bargain"

Language of Section 2-313, 104 COM.

L.

J.

316, 322 (1999).

DICTIONARY
BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY (6'^ ed.

1990).

RESTATEMENT AND CODE
THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (FIRST RESTATEMENT)

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

(ed.

1999)

UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT

NOTE
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
(1966).

COLUM.

L. Rev., 917,

918

84

DRAFT
American Law

Institute,

Uniform Commercial Code [New] Revised Article

Discussion Draft (April 14, 2000)

2, Sales,

OF CASES

LIST

Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).

•

Cippollone

•

East River S.S. Corp.,

•

Spring Motors Distributors Inc.

•

Moorman Manufacturing
111.

v.

Transamerica Delaval

v.

v.

106

Inc.

2295 (1986).

S. Ct.

Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).

Co., v. National

Tank

Co.. 91

111.

2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, 61

Dec. 746(1982).
Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. 195 Neb. 22, 237 N.W.2d 92 (1975).

•

Shotkoski

•

Elanco Products Co.,

v.

v.

writ ref'd n.r.e. (1972)

Akin-Tunnell (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo) 474 S.W.2d 789,

and aff'd

in part,

rev

'd in

part on other grounds (Tex. Civ.

App. Amarillo) 516 S.W.2d 726 (1975).
•

Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.

v.

Moushon

(4'^

Dist) 93

111.

App. 2d 280, 235

N.E.2d 263 (1968).
•

Chase Resorts,

Inc., v.

Johns-Manville Corp. (Ed

Mo) 476

F.

Supp. 633, aff'd 620

F.2d 203 (1980).
•

Diepeveen

v.

•

Downie

Abex

•

Valley Datsun

•

Royal Business Machines,

•

S--C Industries

•

Hill Aircraft

v.

Larry Vogt,

&

Inc.,

27 N.J. Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (1954).

Corp., 74 1 F.2d 1235(1 0"' Cir.

v.

v.

1

984).

Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (1979).

Inc., v.

Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34

American Hydroponics System,

Leasing Corp.,

v.

Simon,

1

85

Inc..

(7'^ Cir.

1980).

468 F.2d 852 (1972).

22 Ga. App. 524,

1

77 S.E.2d 803

( 1

970).

86

•

Rhodes
Busch

Lodi Door

v.

Inc.,

1

599 A.2d 320

Inc.,

986 W.L.2 3427 (D.Utah
1

(R.I.

1991

1

986). Smith

v.

Anheuser-

).

Lutz Farmsv. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (lO"" Cir. 1991).
Unified School Dist. No. 500

v.

United States

Gypsum

Co., 788 F. Supp.

1

173 (D.

Kan. 1992).

Winston
cert.

App

Industries, Inc., v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. 55 Ala.

525, 317 So. 2d 493.

den. 294 Ala. 775, 317 So. 2d 500 (1975).

Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp.

& Cooper, Inc., v.

Young

Perfetti v.

McGhan

Autzen
Flory

Coming

V.

v.

Vestring, 214 Kan. 31

Glass Works, 1990

WL

Cir. 1983).

105615, 5 (D. Mass. 1990).

John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, 280 Or. 783 (1977).

Byrd Motor Lines

633 P.2d 383, 390 (Ariz. 1981).

Dunlop Tire

v.

V.

Corey

Furgat Tractor

Carpetland, U.S.A.

v.

Transurface Carriers,

Witkowski

&

Rubber Corp., 304

Agway, 506 F.2d 551, 555 (2d

Bigelow

V.

Mack

&

2d 773, 778 (1983).

Cir. 1974).

Equip., Inc., 147 Vt. 477, 520

Inc.. v.

Trucks,

v.

Troutt

Nash AMC/Jeep.

Kline-Volvo,

Polycon Indus.,

S.E.

A.2d 600 (1986).

Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).

Kindling

V.

324 (1974).

Xerographic Supplies, 719 F.2d 1092, 1101(11'^

v.

V. Silvercrest, Indus.,

v.

1,

Medical. 99 N.M. 645, 651 (1983).

Royal Typewriter Co.
Stuto

(Mo. App) 533 S.W.2d 257 (1976).

Inc., v.

Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42
Inc.,

Inc.,

Inc,

712 F.2d 1352

(7'*^

(

I" Cir. 1984).

Cir. 1983).

1996 W.L. 208500 (Minn.

Ct.

App. 1996).

157 Ga. App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

Hercules, Inc., 471 F.Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979).

87

Company

•

Ford Motor

•

Hapag Lloyd A.G.

•

P

&

v.

F Constr. Corp..

v.

Reid. 250 Ark.

Marine Indem.
v.

Friend

1

76,

Ins. Co.,

Lumber Corp.

465

S.

W.2d 80

( 1

576 So.2d. 1330

97 1

).

App. 1991)

(Fla.

31 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 575 N.E.2d 61

(1991)
•

Amcast

Indus. Corp., v. Detrex Corp. 779 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Ind.

part, rev'dinpart, 2F.3d

746

(7'^ Cir.

1

Rhude, 295 N.W. 304, 307 (Minn. 1940)

La Mourea

•

Winterbottom

•

Collins Co. V. Carboline Co., 125 I11.2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988).

•

Dravo

•

Continental Sand

v.

in

1993).

•

v.

99 1), aff'd

v.

Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).

German, 73 Or. App.

&

1

65,

Gravel, Inc.,

v.

1

(

985).

K&K

Sand

&

Gravel, Inc., 755 F.2d 87

(7'*^

Cir.

1985).

•

Richardson

•

Cundy

•

Neuman

v.

Car Lot Co., 462 N.E.2d 459,462

v. International

v.

( 1

983).

Trencher Service, 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1984).

Spector Wrecking

&

Salvage Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1973).
•

Lackawanna Leather Co.

v.

Martm

&

Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8""

Cir. 1984).

•

Mainline Tractor

•

Chrysler Corp.,

•

Studebaker Corp.,

•

Jones

•

Ford Motor Co.,

V.

v.

v.

Nutrite Corp., 937 F.Supp. 1095 (1996).

Wilson Plumbing, Co.,
v. Nail,

1

32 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321(1 974).

82 Ga. App. 779, 784, 62 S.E.2d 198.

Cranman's Sporting Goods. 142 Ga. App. 838, 237 S.E.2d 402 (1977).
v.

Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224 S.E.2d 168 (1976).

Washburn Storage

Co.. v. General Motors Corp.. 90 Ga. App. 380(3), 83 S.E.2d 26.

Griffith V. Chevrolet

Motor Division of General Motors Corp., 105 Ga. App. 588(1),

125S.E.2d525.
J.C.

Lewis Motor Co.,

Gochey

v.

Whitman

v.

Bombardier,

v.

Simmons, 128 Ga. App.

Inc.,

Consolidated

153 Vt. 607, 572 A.2d 921 (1990).

Aluminum

Timberland Lumber Co., Ltd.
Baxter

v.

New Moon

Groppel Co.,

Old Albany
Horizons,

R&L

v.

Homes,

United States

Estates, Ltd. v.

Avco

Inc., v.

Grain Co.,

v.

Climax Mfg. Co.,

CCA.

v.

&

Community T.V.

P. (2d)

409

548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976).

Inc.,

Gypsum

Co., 616

S.W.2d 49 (Mo.

Highland Carpet Mills,

Inc.,

App. 1981).

Ct.

604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979).

Chicago Eastern Corp., 531 F.Supp. 201 (N.D.
Sheridan Iron Works.

v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500

General Supply

3d, 1932, 61 F.(2d) 391.

Corp., 551 F.Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982).

Western Equipment Co.

Lewis

v.

Corp., 637 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

Ford Motor Co., 1932, 168 Wash. 456, 12

v.

Morrow

113, 195 S.E.2d 781.

Equip. Co.

(8'^ Cir.

v. Phillips,

Inc..

1981).

111.

605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).

1971).

490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.

Ct.

Serv. Inc., v. Dressor Indus. Inc., 586 F.2d 637

App. 1972).

(8'*^

Cir.),

reh

'g

denied, 586 F.2d 637 (8'^ Cir. 1978).

Taylor

V.

Alfama481 A.2d 1059

&

Hansen

v.

Firestone Tire

Ghema

v.

Ford Motor Co.

Scheuler

V.

Aamco

(Vt. 1984).

Rubber Co. (CA 6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254

(1''

Dist.)

Transmissions,

246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal.

Inc.,

1

Kan. App. 2d 525. 571

(6'^ Cir.

Rptr.

P. 2d

1960).

94 (1966).

48 (1977)

89

Funk

Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp. (2d Dept.) 23 App. Div.2d 771, 258 N.Y.S.2d 553

V.

(1965)).

General Motors Corp.

Kyker

Dodson. 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960)

General Motor Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884.

v.

Westric Battery Co.
Spiegel

v.

Saks 34'^

V.

(CA

Standard Electric Co.

v.

street,

10 Colo.) 482 F 2d 1307 (1973).

252 N.Y.S.2d 852, aff'd (2d Dept.) 26 App. Div.2d 660,

272 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1964).
Klein

Sears Roebuck

v.

Neville Constr. Co.

Sawan,

Inc., v.

«fe

Co.

Cook

v.

(CA4 Md) 773

Paint

F.2d 1421 (1985).

& Varnish Co.

American Cyanamid Co., 21

1

(CAS Neb.) 671 F.2d

1

107 (1982).

Ga. 764, 88 S.E.2d 152, conformed to

92 Ga. App. 598, 89 S.E.2d 565 (1955).
Hauter

Zogarts, 14Cal.3dl04, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 534 P 2d 377 (1975).

V.

Neville Constr. Co.,

Sylvestn
Keith

Harris

Warner

&

v.

Scheuler

Ct.

1

107

(8'^ Cir.

1982).

Cir. 1968).

App. 1985).

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 199 Cal. Rptr. 789

v.

Aamco

Randy Knitwear,
v.

Toni

v.

R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E. 2d 19

Transmissions,

Hawkins Constr. Co.

v.

Varnish Co., 671 F.2d

Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d

Crest Container Corp.,

Drier

&

(Cal. Ct.

App. 1984).

Belton, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).

v.

Rogers

Paint

Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal.

v.

Fundin

v.

Cook

v.

v.

571

P. 2d

48 (Kan.

Ct.

App.

Ct. 1982).

App. 1977).

Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973).

Inc., v.

Home

Inc.,

(111.

American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1962).

Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958).

Perfection, Inc.,

259 N.W.2d496 (S.D.I 977).

90

Randy Knitwear

American Cyanamid Co.,

Inc., v.

1 1

N.Y.2d

5,

181 N.E.2d 399,

226

N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
Terry

Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C.

v.

Henningsen

Semowich

v.

1,

138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).

Bloomfield Motor Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1988

v. R.J.

WL

123930 (N.D.N. Y. 1988).

Chemical Corporation, 591 F.2d 352

Drayton

v. Jiffee

Omaha

Pollution Control Corp., v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., (413 F. Supp. 1069

(6'*'

Cir. 1978).

(1976)).

Hawkins Construction

Co., v.

Matthews

Co.,.

(190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643

(1973))
Ball V. Mallinkrodt

Connolly
Jones

Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp.

V. Kellner,

Kmlaw

V.

Gardner

Hansen

v.

v.

Thomas
Rptr.

v.

v.

Chemical Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).
1

98,

1

88 A.2d 884

(

963).

1

451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio App. 1982).

Long Mfg. N.C,

Inc.,

298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552. (1979).

Q.H.S., Inc., (C A4 SC) 448 F.2d 238
Firestone Tire

&

( 1

97 1 ).

Rubber Co. (CA 6 Mich.) 276 F.2d 254 (1960).

Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. (2d Dist.) 255 Cal. App. 2d 806, 63 Cal.

454(1967).

American Tobacco Co.
Torres

v.

Inc., v. Grinnell,

951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1998).

Northwest Engineering, 86 Haw. 383, 949 P.2d 1004

Community

TV

Service Inc.,

denied, 586 F.2d 637

Select Port Inc., v.

(8"^ Cir.

v.

Dresser Indus.

Inc.,

(Ct.

586 F.2d 637

App. 1998).

(8'^ Cir.),

1978).

Babcock Swine

Inc.,

640 F.2d 147

(8"^ Cir.

1981).

reh

'g

91

•

Ricwil, Inc..

•

In re

•

Inglis V.

Lone

V.

S.L. Pappas

&

Co.,

599 So.2d

Star Industries 776 F.Supp.

American Motors Corp..

3

1

126 (Ala. 1992).

206 (D.Md. 1991).

Ohio St.2d 132. 32 Ohio Op.2d 136. 209 N.E.2d

583(1965).
•

Simone

v.

Genmar

Indus. Inc., 1989

A.M.C. 2627, 2629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

